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Seth D. Harris*
Part I - Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 creates a problem-solving zone within 
which workers with disabilities and their employers have broad latitude to reach agreement about 
how the employer should accommodate the employee’s disability.2 The ADA’s central problem-
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1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000). 
2 See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1, 15-16 (1996). 
2solving forum is the “interactive process.”3 Workers with disabilities propose accommodations.  
Employers accept the workers’ proposals or offer alternatives.4 And, as its descriptive title 
suggests, the interactive process contemplates the employer and worker exchanging information 
and possible solutions in a collaborative effort to find the least costly and most effective 
accommodation.5
Before an economically rational employer will engage meaningfully in the interactive 
process, however, it must conclude that the product of the interactive process — that is, an 
agreement to provide an accommodation to a worker with a disability — will benefit it.   Simply, 
employers will agree to negotiate over accommodations for workers with disabilities if they can 
 
3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2003) (in order to determine the appropriate accommodation for a qualified 
individual with a disability, the employer and the workers with a disability must engage in the interactive process). 
 4 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2003) (interpretive guidance stating that the employer “must” engage in the 
interactive process); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34 (1989) (“A problem-solving approach should be used to identify the 
particular tasks or aspects of the work environment that limit performance and to identify possible accommodations . 
. . employers first will consult with an involve the individual with a disability in deciding on the appropriate 
accommodation”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990) (same).  
5 The ADA requires only that employers provide “reasonable accommodations” that will not impose an 
“undue hardship” on the employer.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000).  Only when an employer and a worker with 
a disability cannot agree does the task of defining the “reasonableness” of a proposed accommodation, and how 
much hardship is “undue,” fall to a court. See Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. 
Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 147 
(2003).  
3expect the accommodation to generate a net benefit.6 Otherwise, the interactive process will 
likely fail or not occur at all.  This article argues that employers can benefit from providing their 
incumbent employees with accommodations in some, perhaps many, circumstances.  Thus, an 
economically rational employer should welcome the interactive process as a fertile opportunity 
to reap increased benefits from employing a worker with a disability.7
6 One relevant consideration in the calculation of net benefits is the transaction costs of reaching, 
memorializing, and implementing the agreement to provide an accommodation. Ronald Coase described 
"transaction costs" as follows: "In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is one 
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up 
to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract 
are being observed, and so on."  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960); see 
also R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (quoting Carl. J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality,
22 J.L. & ECON. 148 (1979)) (describing "transaction costs" as "search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs."); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against 
"Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 615-16 (1989) (defining "transaction costs" as including "get-together costs," 
"decision and execution costs," and "information costs"); Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The 
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 405 (1997) ("measurable costs of entering into 
transactions").  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 20-22 (1985) for a fuller 
discussion of transaction costs.  This article does not address these transaction costs, but the subject is worthy of 
further consideration. 
7 I will hereafter employ the ADA’s lexicon and refer to the employee’s “impairment” rather than the 
employee’s “disability.”  The ADA defines “disability” as “a mental or physical impairment which substantially 
limits a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).  Thus, the employee has an impairment, while the interaction 
of the impairment and the employee’s environment creates a “disability.”  See Seth D. Harris, Introduction: 
Understanding the Context for the 'Coelho Challenge' - Our Right to Work, Our Demand to be Heard: People With 
4This article applies “internal labor market theory” to assess how employers benefit from 
providing accommodations.  This labor economics theory considers the causes and effects of 
barriers to competition found in the labor market consisting of an employer’s incumbent 
workforce.8 Internal labor market theory holds that these barriers to competition can increase the 
 
Disabilities, the 2004 Election, and Beyond, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 711, 721 (2004); see generally Michael A. 
Stein, Same Struggle, Same Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 599 
(2004) (discussing the received wisdom’s reliance on the flawed premise that disabilities inhere in workers with 
disabilities rather than the socially constructed environments in which they work). 
8 I have previously used internal labor market theory to analyze the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
ADA in U.S. Airways v. Barnett. See Harris, supra note 5.  I argued that Barnett signaled that the Supreme Court 
had been influenced by internal labor market theory in its analysis of the role of seniority systems in the workplace.  
Id. at 126.  My earlier article, and the instant article, contribute to a rich body of econo-legal literature which uses 
internal labor market theory to assess the efficiency of labor and employment laws.  See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & 
Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363,370-375 
(1995); Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Lets Call it a Draw”: Striker Replacements and the Mackay Doctrine, 58 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1008-1010 (1997); George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The 
Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 43RD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON LABOR, 109 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law 
and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 432 (1992); Seth D. Harris, 
Coase’s Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1203 (2002); 
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 
(1993); Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension 
Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 529-530 (1997); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, 
The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of 
Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1355-1365 (1988). 
5efficiency of the relationships between employers and employees.   Since accommodations 
issues involving incumbent employees frequently arise in an internal labor market, understanding 
the internal labor market’s competitive barriers and their effects on the employment relationship 
is critical to assessing when and whether employers will reap an economic benefit from 
providing an accommodation to an incumbent employee with an impairment.9 Thus, this article 
makes a new contribution to an ongoing debate among scholars like Michael Stein, J. Hoalt 
Verkerke, Christine Jolls, Stewart Schwab and Steven Willborn, and John Donohue whose 
economic analyses of workplace accommodations were premised on the assumption that 
employers’ accommodations decisions are made in a competitive labor market.10 Since a very 
large majority of employment discrimination claims, including ADA claims, are brought by 
incumbent employees rather than job applicants,11 this article’s internal labor market analysis 
 
9 See infra Part IIB, Part IIC, and Part IID. 
10 Michael A. Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003); J.H. 
Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903 (2003); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000);  Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197 (2003); John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and 
Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897 (2001). 
11 See Jolls, supra note 10, at 223, 227-28, 265-66, 275 (arguing that the ADA’s prohibitions on hiring are 
difficult to enforce and ineffective as a result); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
271, 290,  n.105 (2000) (same); see also Jolls, supra note 10, at 276-77 (discussing empirical evidence showing that 
the ADA has reduced the employment levels of people with disabilities consistent with this thesis); Daron 
Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?: The Case of the Americans with 
6contributes an important and heretofore unwritten chapter — possibly the largest chapter — to 
the story of the economics of accommodating workers with disabilities.  
 Nonetheless, this article’s analysis and conclusions are limited.  The analysis considers 
only accommodations for incumbent employees working for employers with internal labor 
markets.12 Also, because it offers an economic analysis, this article considers only workplace 
accommodations which affect an employee’s productivity.13 Finally, this article does not 
 
Disabilities Act, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 915, 916-17 (2001)(same); see generally John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII 
Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1426 n.36 (1986)(making the same argument about the difficulty of enforcing 
hiring claims under Title VII ); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1311, 1326 (1989) (same); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 517-19 (1987) (same) 
12 More precisely, this article does not address the question of whether employers can benefit from 
agreeing to provide accommodations to workers hired from the entry-level market (i.e., the “external labor market”). 
See generally Verkerke, supra note 10, at 923-33 (discussing how the ADA redresses market failures in the external 
labor market); see also infra text accompanying notes 35-36 (discussion of the “external labor market”).  Also, it 
does not address incumbent employees in industries that do not foster internal labor markets.  See, e.g., ALAN HYDE,
WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 
(2003)(discussing the information technology industry’s labor market in California’s Silicon Valley).
13 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000) (“The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that such individual holds or desires”).  Accommodations neither necessarily nor 
universally increase productivity. By its terms, the ADA’s accommodation mandate is not limited to productivity-
related measures.  See infra note 20 (quoting the ADA’s definition of “discriminate”); see also Vande Zande v. 
Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 33 F.3d 538, 545-546 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing an accommodation unrelated to 
7endorse the normative proposition that efficiency considerations should define the scope of an 
employer’s obligation under the ADA nor any argument that efficiency defines the scope of the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate.  Efficiency does not define “reasonable accommodation.”14 
The analysis will show that efficient accommodations are not merely facilitated by the 
internal labor market’s competitive barriers.  Employer-provided accommodations and 
employees’ impairments are competitive barriers that can increase the efficiency of relationships 
between employers and their employees with impairments.  Accommodations and impairments 
tighten the bonds between the employer and the employee.  This tighter bond makes possible a 
range of cost cutting and productivity-enhancing behaviors that yield larger dividends for the 
employer.  As a result, the cost of an accommodation is not the only factor that is relevant to 
determining whether an employer will benefit from providing an accommodation to an 
incumbent employee with an impairment.  The willingness of the parties to seize the opportunity 
to make their relationship more productive and cost efficient — an opportunity created by the 
accommodation and impairment — is a critical factor in determining whether an employer 
benefits from accommodating an employee with an impairment. 
 
productivity).  Nonetheless, discussions of accommodations that are entirely unrelated to employee productivity are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
14 Even jurists identified with the law and economics movement do not endorse that approach.  See Vande 
Zande, 33 F.3d at 545-546 (Posner, J.) (“It would not follow that… an accommodation would have to be deemed 
unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not be 
disproportionate to the benefit.”); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2nd Cir. 1995) 
(Calabresi, J.) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, holding that “an accommodation is reasonable only if its costs are 
not clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce”).  
8Some definition of “benefit” is needed to assess this article’s claim that employers can 
benefit from providing accommodations.  This article will use two measures.  First, the employer 
may be better off accommodating the employee than continuing its relationship with that 
employee without the accommodation.  In other words, the employer is better off with the 
accommodation than without it.  Second, the employer may be better off accommodating the 
employee than if the employee did not have an impairment; that is, the employer may be better 
off with the accommodation and the impairment than without the impairment.15 This article will 
argue that accommodating incumbent employees with impairments can benefit employers 
according to both of these measures, although satisfying the first measure will prove easier than 
satisfying the second. 
 These two measures of employer benefits are not beset by several problems that render a 
different, possibly more intuitively appealing measure less valuable — that is, comparing the 
costs and benefits of employing and accommodating workers with impairments with the costs 
and benefits of employing workers without impairments.  First, relying on a comparison between 
two different groups of workers does not isolate the accommodation’s effects.  It also takes the 
 
15 I acknowledge a moral hazard associated with this argument; that is, it suggests a risk that employers 
would benefit from inflicting some kind of harm on their employees that would result in an impairment.  This risk is 
actually quite small, if it exists at all.  First, this article does not argue that every employer will benefit from 
accommodating every impairment; thus, a baseball-bat wielding employer would bear the risk of deriving no benefit 
or suffering a loss in some cases.  Second, this article argues that employers benefit from accommodating 
impairments through cooperation with their employees with impairments.  Presumably, an employee would be less 
willing to cooperate with an employer who intentionally caused her harm.  Finally, and most obviously, employers 
intentionally inflicting harm on their employees subject themselves to various kinds of civil and criminal liability. 
9impairment’s effects into account.  Of course, the impairment and its effects are not products of 
the ADA’s accommodation mandate.  Also, the accommodation and the impairment have 
different effects on the employment relationship.16 These effects must be isolated and assessed 
separately from an accommodation’s costs and benefits.  This article’s analysis does that. 
 Second, comparing workers with impairments to workers without impairments confuses 
the analysis of accommodations’ costs and benefits by taking into account productivity 
differences among workers that are unrelated to impairments.  Even in the absence of an 
impairment and an accommodation, workers’ productivity differs.17 So, the costs and benefits of 
employing different workers will vary even before taking accommodations into account.  This 
article’s analysis eliminates this irrelevant factor by offering a model that compares one 
employee’s productivity both before and after an impairment arises and before and after the 
employer provides an accommodation.  Finally, when an employee with an impairment is 
already a part of the employer’s workforce, hiring a replacement worker carries costs.18 Any 
comparison of employees with impairments and workers without impairments must take these 
costs into account.  This article’s analysis does. 
 In pristine market conditions, rational economic actors ordinarily should not need a 
nudge to engage in behavior from which they will benefit.  Assuming that such conditions ever 
exist, internal labor market theory explains that many employment relationships operate in a non-
 
16 Compare Part IIB1 with Part IIB2. 
17 See Michael A. Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 314, 325-328 (2000); see Verkerke, supra note 10, at 908. 
18 See infra Part IIIA. 
10
competitive environment — really, a bilateral monopoly19 — in which the parties are bargaining 
over the division of a surplus.  As a result, there is room for the ADA to play a role in enhancing 
efficiency.  This article argues that it can in many circumstances.  In particular, the ADA helps to 
create the opportunity for employers to benefit from providing accommodations to their 
incumbent employees with impairments.  Perhaps most important, it imposes an accommodation 
mandate20 and subjects employers who do not satisfy the accommodation mandate to added 
costs.21 Further, the ADA’s accommodation mandate sets the norm for appropriate treatment of 
workers with disabilities in American society.  The ADA also either requires or strongly 
encourages employers to engage in an interactive process with their employees to find a cost-
effective means to satisfy the accommodation mandate.22 It also urges the parties to use 
 
19 See infra text accompanying note 49. 
20 42 U.S.C. 12112 (b)(5) (2000) (defining “discriminate” to include “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”).  
21 See infra Part IIIB (discussion of litigation costs associated with ADA reasonable accommodations 
claims). 
22 Courts disagree about whether a failure to engage in the interactive process is a violation of the ADA. 
Compare Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015-1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (an employer’s failure to engage in 
the interactive process is not sufficient to show that the employer violated the ADA’s accommodation mandate) with 
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2000) (an employer’s failure to engage in the 
interactive process violates the ADA). Even if it is not, the ADA creates a significant incentive for employers to 
engage in the interactive process by exempting from compensatory and punitive damages those employers that 
11
alternative disputes resolution systems, like mediation, to assist their negotiations over 
accommodations.23 In sum, this article tells a affirmative story about the ADA and the important 
role it plays in benefiting both employees with disabilities and their employers.  It therefore 
stands in sharp contrast to the large body of scholarly literature that criticizes the ADA for being, 
on the one hand, ineffective, and on the other hand, inefficient.24 
For example, the received wisdom in the academy suggests that employers generally do 
not benefit from the ADA’s mandate to accommodate workers with disabilities.  It holds that the 
ADA’s accommodation mandate is redistributive and, therefore, qualitatively and normatively 
different from traditional anti-discrimination mandates.  Anti-discrimination mandates, according 
to this view, require employers to treat like workers alike.  They merely prohibit employers from 
engaging in the inefficient behavior of drawing irrational distinctions between similarly situated 
 
demonstrate “[a] good faith effort[], in consultation with the person with the disability . . . to identify and make a 
reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (3) (2000).  
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000) ("Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of 
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-
finding, mini-trials, arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter") (emphasis added); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 Pt. 3 at 76-77  (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 445, 499-500 (further discussing 
Congress’ encouragement of voluntary alternative dispute resolution in ADA cases). 
24 See, e.g., infra note 136 (citing studies showing that plaintiffs lose 90% of ADA litigation that matures 
into a reported judicial decision); supra note 11 (listing articles and studies finding that the ADA has not increased 
the employment rate among people with disabilities).  See also generally infra note 25 (listing articles articulating 
the “received wisdom” that the ADA is inefficient because it imposes added costs on employers without assuring 
any added benefits). 
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workers.  Accommodation mandates, on the other hand, require employers to treat different 
workers differently or, more precisely, better, without any assurance that employers will reap 
benefits in return. Thus, the ADA requires employers to give special benefits to workers with 
disabilities while receiving the same productivity that could be provided by workers without 
disabilities absent the added costs of an accommodation, according to this majority view. 25 
25 See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Dealing with Diversity: Changing Theories of Discrimination, 10 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 481, 492 (1995)(“Even if reasonable accommodations enable individuals to perform 
the essential functions of a job they could not otherwise perform, will they be as effective as an applicant who does 
not require accommodation?”); John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three 
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH L. REV. 2583, 2609 (1994)(“Clearly, given a choice between two equally productive 
workers, one requiring the expenditure of significant sums in order to accommodate him and one requiring no such 
expenditures, the profit-maximizing firm would prefer the worker who is less costly to hire.”); RICHARD EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 487 (1992)(describing the ADA 
as “[i]nsisting that disabled individuals be accorded job opportunities that cost more than they are worth”); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate 
the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L REV. 307, 315-16 (2001)(“the basic accommodation claim under 
the ADA accepts the propriety of the employer’s ability to measure productivity while simultaneously arguing that 
there is an intervening duty to alter the work environment, even if a disabled employee may never be as productive 
as a non-disabled potential employee.”); MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?: THE CHOICE BETWEEN 
REGULATION AND TAXATION 8-9 (1999)(describing the ADA’s accommodation mandate as requiring the provision 
of “beneficial, non-market-rational treatment to certain customers (or workers)”); Mark Kelman, Market 
Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN L. REV. 833, 836 (Apr. 2001)(defining “accommodation” as “a claim to 
receive treatment from a defendant that disregards some (though not all) differential input costs”); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Foreword — Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 
(2000)(“The ADA required not only that disabled individuals be treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with 
13
Accommodation mandates thereby violate anti-discrimination law’s equality principle without 
the justification that efficiency gains will result.26 
Critics of the received wisdom have responded with several arguments.  Some scholars, 
including Amy Wax,27 have enlisted the societal costs of unequal employment opportunities for 
 
whom they were similarly situated, but also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably 
better, to achieve an equal effect.”); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act,
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 31 (the ADA “not only required employers to stop discriminating against persons with 
disabilities, but explicitly demanded that they shoulder the costs necessary to enable persons with disabilities to 
work”); Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES,
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 18, 21 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed., 1991)(“By forcing employers to pay for work site and 
other job accommodations that might allow workers with impairing conditions defined by the law to compete on 
equal terms, it would require firm to treat unequal people equally, this discriminating in favor of the disabled.”); 
Schwab & Willborn, supra note 10; but see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that 
accommodations may benefit employers if they increase the productivity of employees with disabilities or other 
employees or expand the employer’s customer base, but also asserting that some employers will not benefit because 
employers will incur higher costs associated with accommodations and assessments of employees with disabilities’ 
productivity).
26 This view is so widely held and deeply believed that it has been dubbed “canonical” by two prominent 
scholars who dissent from it. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
643 (2001); Michael A. Stein, supra note 7, at 582. 
27 Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1421 (2003); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 921 (2003) (arguing that this “welfare reform” argument in support of the ADA was a principal 
rhetorical tool of the ADA’s proponents in Congress and beyond, but that this approach limitats the effective 
implementation of the ADA); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans 
14
people with disabilities — for example, the high costs of Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) — to argue that the ADA promotes societal efficiency, if not efficiency for any particular 
employer.  While essentially conceding that the accommodation-providing employer’s costs will 
exceed its benefits, these critics have argued that society benefits because accommodations 
increase employment among workers with disabilities and society avoids the costs associated 
with these workers’ idleness.  If the money saved on SSDI and other cash transfers exceeds the 
aggregate costs of accommodations, then society derives a net benefit, even if individual 
employers do not.  A second group of scholars, including J. Hoalt Verkerke and Michael Stein, 
have argued that the ADA’s accommodation mandate cures significant labor market failures.  
Smoother functioning markets increase societal efficiency.28 By clearing away barriers to 
smooth competition in the labor market, the ADA may also benefit some employers.29 
A third group of scholars, most notably Christine Jolls and Michael Stein (again), has 
attacked the notion that a clear and immutable distinction can be drawn between anti-
discrimination mandates and accommodation mandates.30 Jolls emphasized the practical 
similarities between accommodation mandates and certain disparate impact claims and the 
normative similarities between accommodation mandates and disparate treatment claims directed 
 
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998) (discussing generally 
the interaction between benefits programs and the ADA). 
28 See Verkerke, supra note 10 (discussing how the ADA redresses market failures); Stein, supra note 10, 
at 84-86 (same); Stein, supra note 17, at 320-322 (same).  For a discussion of Verkerke’s analysis, see Part IIC. 
29 See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 933; Stein, supra note 17, at 325-28. 
30 See Jolls, supra note 26, at 644-47; Stein , supra note 7, at 583-86. 
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at practices that are sometimes called “rational discrimination.”31 These similarities belie the 
notion that anti-discrimination measures and accommodation mandates are fundamentally and 
qualitatively different.32 Stein expanded Jolls’s argument.  Building on the disabilities studies 
movement’s teachings that the barriers confronting workers with disabilities are socially 
constructed, Stein concluded that eliminating socially constructed barriers to equal employment 
opportunity lies at the heart of the anti-discrimination enterprise regardless of whether the 
barriers relate to race, sex, or disability.33 Most important for this article’s purposes, Jolls and 
Stein also argued that, because of their similarities, both anti-discrimination mandates and 
accommodation mandates impose costs on employers.  Thus, the received wisdom’s reliance on 
costs as a basis for distinguishing accommodation mandates from traditional anti-discrimination 
efforts is misplaced. 
 This article contributes to the growing and multi-faceted critique of the received wisdom.  
Like Jolls and Stein, I address the role of accommodations’ costs; however, this article directly 
challenges the assumption that accommodations’ costs typically exceed their benefits for the 
employers that provide them.  This article’s analysis will show that employers can derive 
economic benefits from accommodating their incumbent employees with impairments.  As a 
result, workplace accommodations can produce Pareto superior outcomes for employers and 
 
31 See Jolls, supra note 26, at 684.
32 Id. 
33 See Stein, supra note 7, at 583-86; see also generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 38, 85-86, 96, 154-55, 319-21 (1990). 
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employees with disabilities rather than the zero-sum redistributions of resources suggested by the 
received wisdom. 
 Part II describes internal labor market theory and how internal labor markets benefit both 
employees and employers in the absence of an impairment and accommodation.  Looking at 
three different scenarios in which incumbent employees might request accommodations, Part II 
will describe how employees’ impairments can affect the efficiencies of the internal labor 
market.  It will also explain how an accommodation can restore an efficient employment 
relationship and, in some circumstances, yield additional productivity benefits for the employer.  
Part III considers other benefits an employer derives from accommodating an employee with a 
disability.  This part identifies costs which an accommodation allows the employer to avoid — 
that is, the “opportunity benefits” of providing an accommodation.  The added productivity 
benefits made possible by impairments and accommodations in internal labor markets, and the 
opportunity benefits of accommodations, combine to benefit employers providing 
accommodations to their incumbent employees with disabilities. 
 
Part II - Labor Markets, Impairments, and Accommodations
From the employer’s perspective, which is the perspective with which this article is 
concerned, an accommodation produces a net benefit if the productivity increase resulting from 
the accommodation plus any costs avoided as a result of providing the accommodation exceeds 
the cost of the accommodation.  This part will discuss accommodations’ costs and their effects 
on productivity.  The next part will discuss the costs that employers can avoid by 
accommodating employees. 
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This part offers a general and theoretical model for assessing the economic benefits of 
workplace accommodations.  Different inputs will produce different results.  It is not possible to 
declare categorically that accommodating every employee with an impairment will benefit each 
employer.34 Rather, this part concludes only that there are some circumstances in which 
accommodating an employee with an impairment can benefit her employer.  The model 
presented in this section seeks to describe those circumstances and to provide a framework for 
assessing the costs and benefits of accommodations. 
 A. Internal Labor Markets and External Labor Markets
(1) The Internal Labor Market Relationship 
Workers may request accommodations in either of two labor markets.  The job applicant 
and the incumbent employee are situated differently.  An employer’s incumbent employee 
requests an accommodation in the “internal labor market.”  A job applicant requests an 
accommodation in the “external labor market.”35 The external labor market, where employers 
and job applicants bargain over the terms and conditions of employment, is a competitive 
market.  Job applicants are generally mobile.  They offer general skills that may benefit many 
employers.  As a result, employers can choose from among many fungible job applicants.  
 
34 In fact, this model takes into account the possibility that accommodating an employee with an 
impairment may not be the optimal decision for an employer. 
35 The ADA’s protections extend to job applicants.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)  (2000) (“No covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment”) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5) (2000) (requiring reasonable accommodations for applicants as well as employees).  
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Similarly, job applicants can choose from among many fungible employers.  Neither party has 
invested in the relationship before a job offer and acceptance are extended; therefore, there are 
few transaction costs associated with choosing one employer or one worker.  As a result, 
economists expect the external labor market to be competitive and, therefore, supply and demand 
will set the terms and conditions of employment.36 
This article is not concerned with the external labor market.  Instead, it will focus on 
incumbent employees who bargain with their employers in the “internal labor market.”37 The 
internal labor market is characterized by barriers to competition.  These barriers may have 
several sources.  The human capital theory of the internal labor market identifies firm-specific 
skills and knowledge as the principal barrier to competition.38 Incumbent employees acquire 
firm-specific skills and knowledge either through experience, formal training, or relationships 
developed in the workplace.39 These firm-specific skills and knowledge make incumbent 
 
36 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1353. 
37 See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 26, 174 (7th ed. 2000) (defining “internal labor market”). 
38 See Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic 
Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 250, 253 (1975); see also EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 174 
(“Firms most likely to decide that the benefits of using an internal labor market outweigh the costs are those whose 
upper-level workers must have a lot of firm-specific knowledge and training that can best be attained by on-the-job 
learning over the years.”) "Human capital theory," the leading version of internal labor market theory, was given 
early definition in Gary Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9 (1962), 
and Walter Oi, Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor, 70 J. POL. ECON. 538 (1962). 
39 See Williamson et al., supra note 38, at 253, 257; Becker, supra note 38, at 11. 
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employees more productive than otherwise qualified workers who could be hired from the 
external labor market.40 They also make the incumbent employees more productive for their 
current employer than they would be working for another employer.  As a result, both parties are 
willing to invest in the employee’s acquisition of firm-specific skills and knowledge because 
they will share the productivity dividends reaped from them. The employer benefits from greater 
profits generated by the employee’s increased productivity.  The employee benefits because her 
greater productivity allows her aggregate wages (i.e., career compensation) with her current 
employer to exceed the compensation that any other employer could provide.41 
Firm-specific skills and knowledge differ from general skills and knowledge.  General 
skills and knowledge would benefit any employer.  Like firm-specific skills and knowledge, they 
increase an employee’s productivity.  But employers face a significant risk if they invest in their 
employees’ general skills; that is, employees may quit and sell their general skills and knowledge 
to other employers in the external labor market.  No employer wants to invest so that a 
 
40 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 155; Becker, supra note 38, at 11; Williamson et al., supra 
note 38, at 253. 
41 See Schwab, supra note 8, at 15 (“Because the parties share the costs and benefits of training throughout 
the employee's work life, both parties want to continue the relationship.  The employer pays employees less than 
their full value later in their career.  This protects employees from discharge because a discharge would harm the 
employer as well.  The late-career wage exceeds, however, the outside wage the employee could receive, thereby 
discouraging the employee from quitting.”). Empirical evidence supports the view that wages in internal labor 
markets are set according to different standards than those typically considered relevant to the external labor market.  
See, e.g., George Baker & Bengt Holmstrom, Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 255, 258-59 (1995). 
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competitor can yield the productivity returns.42 Thus, employers may be willing to forego the 
productivity benefits of providing their employees with further general skills and knowledge in 
order to avoid the risk of losing their investment. 
 The job-match theory posits that a different set of competitive barriers define the internal 
labor market.   According to job-match theory, an employer systematically underpays its 
employee in the early stages of her career because the employer sets the entry-level wage with 
inadequate information about the employee’s productivity in the job.  As the employer learns 
more about the employee’s productivity over time, the employer becomes better able to pay 
higher wages to employees who are well-matched to their jobs and, therefore, highly productive.  
Longer job tenure exposes better information to the employer; therefore, the employer becomes 
better able over time to pay the employee commensurate with her productivity and to 
compensate her for earlier underpayments.43 In addition, better information about an employee’s 
capabilities allows the employer to match the employee with her “optimal assignment” — that is, 
the job in which the employee will be most productive.44 In turn, the employee’s higher 
productivity in the optimal assignment permits the employer to pay the employee higher wages.  
 
42 See Schwab, supra note 8, at 13 & n.18.  
43 See Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1246 (1979) (setting forth 
the job match theory); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972 (1979) 
[hereinafter Job Matching]. 
44 See Jovanovic, Job Matching, supra note 43, at 974 (assuming that “imperfect information exists on 
both sides of the market about the exact location of one’s optimal assignment.  Following an initial assignment, new 
information becomes available, and the reassignment becomes optimal in certain cases”). 
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Better matched workers are more productive and tend to remain with their firms longer, in part 
because they earn high wages that other employers will not match.45 A virtuous cycle results.  
The incumbent employee is more valuable to the employer than workers from the external labor 
market.  The employer remunerates the employee more richly than would other employers. 
 The “supervision” or “efficiency wage” theory of the internal labor market, on the other 
hand, suggests that employers defer wage payments — that is, they increase employees’ wages 
as the employees’  tenure increases — as a means of encouraging employees to sustain their 
productivity early in their careers.  Although higher wages do not reward incumbent employees 
directly for their present productivity, incumbent employees work harder in the near term to earn 
their reward in the long term.  In other words, higher wages in the later stages of employees’ 
careers are a reward for employees’ earlier diligence.46 Thus, incumbent employees’ 
expectations based on employers’ implicit (or perhaps explicit) promises make the employees 
more productive than workers from the external labor market. 
 
45 See Jacob Mincer & Boyan Jovanovic, Labor Mobility and Wages, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 21, 
26-27 (Sherwin Rosen, ed. 1981); Jovanovich, Job Matching, supra note 43, at 974. 
46 See Erling Barth, Firm-Specific Seniority and Wages, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 495, 496 (1997); see also Robert 
M. Hutchens, Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 60-61 (1989) 
(discussing research supporting the “supervision” theory); see generally Edward Lazear, Agency, Earnings Profiles, 
Productivity, and Hours Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 606 (1981). 
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The relationship between wages, firm tenure, productivity in the internal labor market, 
and productivity and wages in the external labor market has been depicted using the following 
graph:47 
47 See, e.g., Wachter & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1362-63 (offering this graph to depict the internal labor 
market relationship). This graph best describes the internal labor market relationships posited by human capital 
theory and job-match theory.  Both of these theories assume a relationship between productivity rising with tenure 
and wages rising with tenure.  Supervision theory disconnects the employee’s productivity from her wages; 
therefore, a graphical representation of this theory would look different.  The wage curve would be roughly similar 
to the wage curve found in the graph below.  In supervision theory’s purest form, the employee’s productivity curve 
would be close to horizontal, with a slow, steady declining slope like that of the opportunity wage curve. 
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In this graph, W (wage) represents all forms of compensation paid by the employer to its 
employee; MP (marginal productivity) represents the employee’s productivity with her current 
employer; and OW (opportunity wage) represents the worker’s wage in the external labor market 
— that is, the wage the worker would earn from the next best employer.  Because the external 
labor market is competitive, the opportunity wage also tracks the worker’s productivity with the 
next best employer.  Tenure A is the point at which the worker enters the internal labor market.  
Tenure F represents the employee’s retirement from her career with the employer. 
 The employee invests in her relationship with the employer from Tenure A to Tenure D.  
This investment results from the employee accepting a lower wage from her employer than her 
opportunity wage. After Tenure D until Tenure F, the employee earns dividends because her 
wage exceeds her opportunity wage.  As long as the difference between the present value of the 
employee’s wage and the present value of her opportunity wage after Tenure D (i.e., PV(WD-F - 
OWD-F)) exceeds the difference between the present value of the opportunity wage and the 
present value of the wage prior to Tenure D (i.e., PV(OWA-D - WA-D)), the employee will reap a 
net dividend from her sunk investments (i.e., Dee = PV(WD-F - OWD-F) - PV(OWA-D - WA-D)).  If 
this net dividend is greater than zero (i.e., Dee > 0), then the employee benefits from her 
relationship with the employer in the internal labor market.  Further, since the employee earns 
dividends until retirement at Tenure F, the employee has an incentive to remain in the 
relationship with her employer as long as possible, all other things being equal. 
 The employer invests between Tenure A and Tenure B and again between Tenure E and 
Tenure F.  During these periods, the employee’s wage exceeds her productivity. The employer 
earns dividends between Tenure B and Tenure E when the employee’s productivity, higher 
24
because of her implicit contract with the employer, exceeds her actual wage.  Once again, as long 
as the difference between the present value of the employee’s productivity and the present value 
of the employee’s actual wage from Tenure B to Tenure E (i.e., PV(MPB-E - WB-E)) exceeds the 
difference between the present value of the wage and the present value of the productivity from 
Tenure A to Tenure B and from Tenure E to Tenure F (i.e., PV(WA-B - MPA-B) + PV(WE-F - MPE-
F)), the employer will reap a net dividend from its investments (i.e., Der = PV(MPB-E - WB-E) -
(PV(WA-B - MPA-B) + PV(WE-F - MPE-F)). If the net dividend is greater than zero (i.e., Der > 0), 
the employer benefits from its relationship with the employee in the internal labor market.48 
Regardless of whether the barrier to competition is incumbent employees’ firm-specific 
skills and knowledge, job matches, or the employer’s productivity incentive system, the internal 
labor market creates a bilateral monopoly.49 Under ordinary circumstances, the parties will try to 
 
48 This model is subject to caveats.  Perhaps most important, employers have great difficulty isolating an 
individual worker’s productivity or measuring it with the precision suggested by this graph.  One important cause of 
this measurement problem is that employees rarely work entirely on their own, but measuring an individual’s 
contribution to a group’s product may not be possible.  Accordingly, discussions of productivity should usually be 
preceded by a warning that most productivity measures are rough estimates, at best. See Stein, supra note 10, at 140-
42. 
49 There has been a substantial debate over the continuing viability of internal labor markets and, therefore, 
the relevance of internal labor market theory.  No scholar has argued that internal labor markets have entirely 
disappeared from the American economy.  Nonetheless, Katherine Stone, Peter Cappelli, and Paul Osterman, among 
others, have described a series of shocks to the American economy during the 1980s and 1990s wrought by 
globalization, technological developments, deregulation, declining union density rates, and other factors that 
weakened internal labor markets and reduced their relevance.  See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO 
DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT 
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WORK (1999); Peter Cappelli, Career Jobs Are Dead, 42 CALIF. MGT. REV. 146 (Fall 1999); PAUL OSTERMAN,
SECURING PROSPERITY (1999); see generally PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA (2001) (taking a more 
ambiguous position on the viability of internal labor markets, probably reflecting the book’s authorship by 
committee).  Other scholars, most notably Sanford Jacoby, acknowledge the economic shocks to the American 
economy and their importance, but argue that their effects on internal labor markets have been overstated and that 
they signal little more than evolutionary change.  See SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS,
UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2004); Sanford Jacoby, Melting into Air?  
Downsizing, Job Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195 (2000); Sanford Jacoby, Are Career 
Jobs Headed for Extinction?, 42 CALIF. MGT. REV. 123 (Fall 1999); see also Erica L. Groshen & David I. Levine, 
The Rise and Decline (?) Of U.S. Internal Labor Markets (July 1998) (manuscript on file with author)(empirical 
study finding no evidence of decline in internal labor markets); Gary Charness, Changes in the Employment 
Contract?  Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment (Dec. 1999) (manuscript on file with author) (finding that employee 
attitudes have not shifted in a manner that is consistent with a decline in internal labor markets). 
 The better argument is that internal labor markets have survived, but with some modifications that do not 
match the traditional expectations of how they will operate. Michael Piore, whose seminal work with Peter 
Doeringer defined internal labor markets for a generation of labor economists and scholars in law, industrial 
relations, management, human resources, and organizational theory, see PETER DOERINGER & MICHAEL PIORE,
INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ADJUSTMENT (1971), explains the results in this way: 
The world into which we are moving is [] not a world in which the pricing and allocation of labor 
will be wholly governed by market forces, unmediated by administrative rules and social customs.  
We will, in other words, continue to have internal labor markets in the broad sense of the term.  
But the particular forms these internal labor markets will take are extremely varied.  No single 
form will be dominant in the way in which the bureaucratic organization was dominant earlier in 
the post-war period. 
Michael J. Piore, Thirty Years Later: Internal Labor Markets, Flexibility and the New Economy, 6 J. MGT. &
GOVERNANCE 271, 273 (2002).  Recent data tend to support Piore’s conclusion.  Stone and others relied heavily on 
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continue their relationship because each party reaps dividends that are not available elsewhere 
and each party sinks investments into the relationship which they do not want to forfeit.  Thus, 
the employer will be disinclined to discharge the employee.  The employer will also avoid 
behaviors that might cause the employee to quit.  Similarly, the employee will be disinclined to 
quit because no other employer would compensate her at a level equal to that paid by her current 
employer.50 In sum, the benefits derived by the parties from continuing their relationship create 
incentives for a long-term relationship.  The boundary between the external labor market and the 
 
the decline in men’s job tenure rates as evidence of the decline in internal labor markets.  But recent data strongly 
suggest a return to stability in job tenure rates for men and stability for women after a long-term increase. See U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Median Years of Tenure with Current Employer for Employed Wage and Salary 
Workers by Age and Sex, Selected Years, 1983-2004, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.t01.htm (last 
modified Sept. 21, 2004); see also William P. Bridges, Age and the Labor Market: Trends in Employment Security 
and Employment Institutions, in SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 319 
(Ivar Berg & Arne Kalleberg, eds.)(2001)(explaining that declining job tenure rates for older workers does not 
signal the demise of internal labor markets).  The purported rise of alternative work arrangements has also been an 
important reference point in the debate over internal labor markets, but the percentage of the American workforce 
engaged in alternative work arrangements has been stable since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting these 
data.  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm; see also Arne L. Kalleberg, Evolving Employment Relations in 
the United States, in SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 187 (Ivar Berg & 
Arne Kalleberg, eds.) (2001).  In sum, internal labor markets and, therefore, internal labor market theory remain 
relevant in the American economy and for American workers. 
50 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 168-170, 381-382; see also Schwab, supra note 8, at 115. 
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internal labor market is the point at which there are sunk investments and prospective dividends 
which the parties do not want to lose. 
 Yet, there is no formal, explicit, legally enforceable contract codifying this arrangement 
in typical circumstances.  These implicit agreements in the internal labor market broadly set the 
terms for a long-term employment relationship but do not mandate specific behaviors throughout 
the life of the agreement.51 The type of detailed, long-term, written contract that would be 
needed to produce this result is impractical and uncommon.  Among other reasons, the 
transaction costs associated with negotiating and enforcing a formal, detailed, complex, and 
contingent contract would be prohibitive.52 Further, specific agreements regarding future 
behaviors (i.e., the amount of work expected from the employee, the amount of pay required of 
the employer) subject the parties to the risks associated with changing circumstances.  The 
parties’ inability to predict every contingency that might arise over the life of their employment 
relationship — that is, “bounded rationality” — requires preserving flexibility to take account of 
changing circumstances.53 Less specificity and greater flexibility, however, make the agreement 
 
51 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 168-170, 381-382; see also Schwab, supra note 8, at 115. 
52 See Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86, 97 (Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmoud A. Zaidi eds., 1990) 
(“If the parties inside the firm attempt to maximize the coalition’s surplus, they must obviously attempt to reduce 
transactions costs as much as possible (or, more accurately, as much as it is efficient to do so). Since negotiating, 
writing and enforcing contracts often incur high transaction costs, complex state-contingent contracts might not be 
joint profit maximizing.”). 
53 Oliver D. Hart, Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction, 50 REV.
ECON. STUD. 3, 23 (1983) (discussing the role of bounded rationality in contracting).  
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difficult to enforce at law.54 As a result, after the worker is hired, the parties engage in rolling 
renegotiations and reinterpretations of their relationship to re-calibrate the distribution of 
investments and dividends.55 
Without a legal enforcement mechanism, a danger arises that one party will engage in 
“strategic” or “opportunistic” behavior which expropriates some of the other party’s benefits or 
shifts costs onto the other party.56 For example, an employer may be tempted to engage in 
strategic behavior between Tenure E and Tenure F.  The employer has already reaped all of its 
dividends, but the incumbent employee awaits a portion of her dividend because the employer is 
expected to pay the employee a wage in excess of her productivity during this phase of her 
tenure.  So, the employer might fire the employee.  The discharge allows the employer to avoid 
paying wages that will exceed the employee’s productivity.  The employer thereby usurps some 
of the employee’s dividend.57 On the other hand, the employee might be tempted to engage in 
strategic behavior during the period between Tenure B and Tenure E when the employee’s 
productivity exceeds her wage. If the employee “shirks” during this period, and thereby reduces 
 
54 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1212. 
55 Hart, supra note 53, at 23 (“In reality, there exist few contracts between firms and workers containing 
the amount of detail which [may be] appropriate….[C]ontracts tend to be in force for limited periods of time, and 
are then renegotiated.”).  
56 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 8, at1360. 
57 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1208.  Other scholars have offered a similar analysis to argue that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, by deterring this kind of employer opportunism, defends the internal labor 
market’s efficiencies. See, e.g., Minda, supra note 8, at 529-530; Schwab, supra note 8, at 12. 
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her productivity, she usurps some of the employer’s dividend and transforms it into her own 
leisure.  Further, the employer must pay the costs of monitoring the employee’s work more 
closely to minimize her shirking and, perhaps, risk disciplining the employee and undermining 
their relationship further.58 
Strategic behavior may benefit the party that engages in it, but it threatens the efficiencies 
made possible by the internal labor market.  It may also have effects beyond the instant parties 
which, in turn, deprive the party engaging in the strategic behavior of its benefits.  For example, 
an employer’s strategic behavior with respect to one worker might cause other incumbent 
employees to doubt the reliability of their relationship with the employer.59 These co-workers 
might shirk, quit, or demand a costly and specific written agreement that assures them their 
expected dividends.  These costs may exceed the appropriated dividends.60 Workers in the 
external labor market might also learn of the employer’s reputation and shy away from entering 
into an agreement with the employer or demand additional guarantees.61 
B. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market: The After-Hiring Impairment
The preceding section described the general context — the internal labor market 
relationship —  in which an incumbent employee may request an accommodation.  An 
accommodation request may arise in any one of three scenarios in the internal labor market.  In 
the first scenario, the employee develops a physical or mental impairment after being hired 
 
58 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 8, at 1358. 
59 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1208. 
60 See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 8, at1358. 
61 See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 8, at 109, 118.  
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which interacts with her current job to limit the employee’s productivity (i.e., an “after-hiring 
impairment”).  For example, an industrial accident might have caused the employee to suffer a 
permanent partial impairment that must be accommodated for her to perform her job.62 This 
section will consider after-hiring impairments. 
 The second scenario actually involves two different factual situations which, for the 
purposes of this analysis, can be considered together.  An incumbent employee may be promoted 
or transferred out of a job for which she did not need an accommodation into a differently 
structured job that she cannot perform without an accommodation (i.e., “promotion or transfer”).  
For example, an employee with a bad back might be transferred from a sedentary job in an 
airline’s mail room to a cargo-moving job requiring heavy lifting.63 Or, an incumbent 
employee’s job may be re-designed to include new and different functions (i.e., “job re-design”) 
that the employee cannot perform without an accommodation.  For example, an employee with 
carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis in her arms and shoulders might be newly required to hold 
blocks of wood at shoulder-level.64 The next section will consider promotions, transfers, and job 
re-designs. 
 
62 See, e.g., Allen v. Georgia Power Co., 980 F. Supp. 470, 472 (N.D. Ga., 1997) (“Plaintiff injured his 
back when he and co-worker attempted to lift cross-ties onto a truck . . . .  Subsequently, [he] experienced leg pain, 
in addition to the back pain, and was not able to perform numerous job tasks that [employees at the plant] were 
required to perform.”). 
63 See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002). 
64 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002). 
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A third scenario would involve an employee with a non-observable impairment that 
interacts with her current job to reduce her productivity to a level lower than the employer 
expected when the employee was hired.  For example, an employee may have an undisclosed 
hearing limitation which causes her to miss certain instructions from her supervisor.65 The 
section following the next section will consider non-observable, or “hidden,” impairments. 
 (1) Isolating the After-Hiring Impairment’s Effects 
The first scenario arises when an incumbent employee suffers an injury or otherwise 
develops a physical or mental impairment for which the employee needs accommodation to 
perform her current job at the expected level of productivity.66 I will assume, as a preliminary 
matter, that the accommodation would allow the employee’s productivity to return to its pre-
impairment level and increase as expected over time.67 I will also assume that the 
 
65 See e.g., Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp., 89 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff, who was “seriously hard of 
hearing” accepted a job as a nurse in the hemodialysis unit at Methodist Hospital, but due to his impairment he could 
not hear and distinguish between the different alarms from the dialysis machines). 
66 I do not mean to suggest that people with disabilities are inherently less productive that people without 
disabilities.  They are not. See Stein, supra note 10, at 130-134.  Rather, the factual predicate for this analysis is that 
an employee with an impairment requests an accommodation that would affect her productivity by adapting her 
work environment to her impairment. 
67 This result is suggested by the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability.” See supra 
note 13 (giving the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability”). Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that employees with disabilities who have been accommodated can perform at the level expected of an unimpaired 
worker. Some accommodations may not produce this result.  Nonetheless, making this assumption allows for the 
creation of a model which can take into account circumstances that do not fit this assumption. 
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accommodation entails some cost.68 Absent accommodation, and assuming no change in the 
employee’s compensation in the first instance,69 it is possible to assess the impairment’s effects 
on the employee’s dividends and investments and the employer’s dividends and investments. 
 On Graph #1, the incumbent employee’s productivity with her current employer is 
illustrated by the marginal productivity curve (MP).  The employee’s productivity with the next 
best employer is depicted by the opportunity wage curve (OW).  When the impairment occurs, 
both the MP curve and the OW curve will shift down because the impairment interacts with the 
employee’s job in a manner that reduces the employee’s productivity.70 The consequences of the 
after-hiring impairment are depicted in Graphs #2 and #3.  In each graph, the solid lines 
 
68 This article assumes that the accommodation must bear some positive cost because it is very unlikely 
that an employer would hesitate to adopt a cost-free means of increasing an employee’s productivity or, more 
important for this article’s purposes, force a worker into negotiations over adopting the cost-free accommodation. 
69 See infra Part IIC (discussing a scenario in which the employee’s compensation changes).
70 The analysis in this section assumes that the impairment’s productivity effects are the same in the 
internal and external labor markets.  Once again, I do not mean to suggest that this assumption is always true; 
however, this model can be easily modified to relax this assumption and predict the effects therefrom. See generally 
Verkerke, supra note 10, at 910-12 (discussing how workers’ impairments may find better and more productive 
matches in different jobs).  Also, this discussion assumes that the employee’s opportunity wage is a direct function 
of her productivity.  The opportunity wage may be disconnected from and lower than the employee’s actual 
productivity because of market failures, including discrimination.  Finally, the depiction of the impairment’s effects 
on the employee’s productivity in all of the graphs in this paper assumes that the employee’s condition does not 
change over time.  Of course, this assumption will not hold true for people with multiple sclerosis and other 
degenerative conditions.  In these circumstances, the gap between the unadjusted MP and OW curves and the 
adjusted MP and OW curves would grow over time.  
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represent the productivity curves that would have been observed absent the impairment (MP, 
OW), while the dotted lines depict the productivity curves observed with the impairment (MPI,
OW(I)). 
On Graph #2, the impairment occurs at Tenure D.  One very important effect of the 
impairment is that the employee’s dividend increases.  The relationship between the employee’s 
wage and her opportunity wage remains unchanged from Tenure A to Tenure D, so the employee 
does not make any larger investment as a consequence of the impairment.  Yet, the employee 
reaps a larger dividend from Tenure D to Tenure F because the wage remains unchanged while 
the opportunity wage is lower as a result of the impairment.  A larger dividend results because 
the employee’s actual wage exceeds her opportunity wage by a larger amount during this period 
than it would have absent the impairment.  
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The incumbent employee does not realize this increased dividend.  She receives no 
greater compensation, for example.  Instead, the larger dividend is an additional competitive 
barrier in the internal labor market.  It more tightly binds the employee to the employer.  Moving 
from an internal labor market to the external labor market ordinarily causes a worker without a 
disability to suffer a loss in career compensation.71 The impairment effects a tighter bond 
between the employee and the employer because the employee with an after-hiring impairment 
would suffer an even greater wage loss if she were required to seek alternative employment in 
the external labor market.  The additional loss would be equal to the value of the productivity 
lost as a consequence of the impairment.  The incumbent employee’s relationship with the 
employer, therefore, becomes far more valuable to the employee. 
 On Graph #2, the impairment causes the employer to reap smaller dividends than 
expected from its relationship with this employee.  The employer makes the same level of 
investment in the employee between Tenure A and Tenure B and reaps the same dividend 
between Tenure B and Tenure D because the employee’s wage and marginal productivity have 
not changed during periods preceding the impairment.  The employer reaps a smaller dividend 
after Tenure D than it would have received absent the impairment because of the employee’s 
lower level of productivity.  Also, the dividend period no longer extends to Tenure E.  As a result 
of the shift in the marginal productivity curve, the employer’s dividend period ends at Tenure DN.
For the same reasons, the employer makes a larger investment between Tenure DN and Tenure F.  
This larger investment further discounts the employer’s net dividend.  As a result, the employer 
has a weaker economic rationale for sustaining a relationship with the incumbent employee.  At 
 
71 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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best, the employer will reap some dividends from its larger investments.  At worst, the 
employer’s increased investments will exceed the smaller dividends.  Thus, the relationship may 
remain profitable for the employer after the impairment, but this result is less likely than it would 
have been absent the impairment. 
In Graph #3, with the impairment occurring at Tenure B, the employer’s net dividends 
are even smaller.  The employer receives a smaller dividend — that is, marginal productivity in 
excess of wage — for a shorter period of time (i.e., Tenure BN to Tenure DN rather than Tenure B 
to Tenure E).  The employer also makes the same larger investment between Tenure DN and 
Tenure F as was depicted in Graph #2.  Only the investment between Tenure A and Tenure B 
remains unaffected because the employee’s marginal productivity does not change during this 
period.  As a result, the employer’s dividend is smaller when the impairment occurs at Tenure B 
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than when it occurs at Tenure D.  With the impairment occurring at Tenure B, all other things 
being equal, it becomes even less likely that the employer will benefit from a long-term 
relationship with the employee after the impairment. 
 If the impairment occurs at Tenure B, the effect on the employee’s opportunity wage 
means that the employee makes a smaller investment for a shorter period of time (i.e., the 
investment period begins at Tenure A, but ends at Tenure CN rather than Tenure D).  The 
employee also reaps a larger dividend and the dividend period begins at Tenure CN, rather than 
Tenure D, and lasts until Tenure F.72 No change occurs between Tenure A and Tenure B.  As a 
result, the employee reaps a dividend that is larger by the amount of the change in her 
opportunity wage.  The employee’s total dividend is also greater than it would have been with a 
later-occurring impairment because the aggregate decrease in the opportunity wage is greater.  
Thus, an earlier impairment — that is, Tenure B rather than Tenure D — further increases the 
employee’s dividend.  The effect of this larger dividend is to bind the employee with an after-
hiring impairment even more tightly to the employer’s internal labor market.  
 The preceding analysis demonstrates that the effects of an after-hiring impairment on the 
economic relationship between the employer and the incumbent employee vary according to the 
timing of the impairment.  But timing does not change the conclusion that the impairment causes 
the employer’s dividend to shrink and the employee’s dividend to grow.  These are the 
background conditions for determining whether employers can benefit from accommodating 
 
72 There remains a short period at and after Tenure B where the employee’s post-impairment opportunity 
wage exceeds her actual wage.  Seeking employment in the external labor market at this point may benefit the 
employee in the short term.  In the long term, however, the employee’s aggregate compensation will be lower. 
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workers with after-hiring impairments.  The next sub-section introduces an accommodation into 
the equation. 
 (2) Assessing the Accommodation’s Costs and Benefits 
Both parties’ dividends are derived by considering the relationship between the 
employee’s wage and the employee’s productivity; however, the wage is compared to different 
productivity measures to yield each party’s dividend.  The employer compares the wage to the 
employee’s productivity.  The employee compares the wage to her opportunity wage.  Also, the 
effective wage — the value which each party assigns to the wage — may differ for the employee 
and the employer.  This section will explain how these differences create the opportunity for an 
accommodation to produce a Pareto superior result.  Disabilities accommodations are not 
necessarily a zero-sum game and, as a result, they may benefit the employers that provide them. 
 Accommodations costs have been treated as wage increases because they purportedly 
increase the employer’s cost of employing the worker with a disability (i.e., the “effective 
wage”).73 But care must be taken before assigning an accommodation’s costs to an employee’s 
 
73 Although this article’s analysis relies on this assumption, it is troubling.  It may mask a policy choice.  
Workers without disabilities also need accommodations. Workers without wheelchairs need office chairs.  Workers 
with sight need lights.  Workers with hearing need earplugs in some loud environments.  Yet, the costs of these 
accommodations are typically treated as capital investments when they benefit workers without disabilities, not 
wage increases.  An argument has been made that the policy choice to treat accommodations for workers with 
disabilities differently suggests bias. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or 
Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 167 (2000) (“Such judgments have ignored the many 
advantages conferred on the non-disabled and the disadvantages imposed on people with disabilities by features of 
the environment that are virtually invisible or taken for granted. In fact, judicial opinions have increasingly seemed 
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wages.  At a minimum, it may be inappropriate to charge the entire cost of an accommodation to 
an individual employee with an impairment.  The ADA’s Title III requires any employer 
providing a “public accommodation” to make their facilities accessible to people with 
disabilities; therefore, a workplace accommodation may also satisfy the employer’s obligation to 
accommodate the public.  For example, installing a ramp for an employee using a wheelchair 
also makes the employer’s facilities accessible to motion-impaired customers.  Although there is 
no legal obligation in this regard, a ramp also makes the employer’s facility more accessible for 
caregivers pushing strollers, bicyclists, and others.74 The employer may benefit as a result.  
Thus, the cost of the ramp should be amortized across all of its users and reduced by these other 
 
to suggest that the protection granted Americans with disabilities constitutes a kind of unreasonable bias which 
extends beyond the guarantees bestowed on other individuals. No attention is devoted to the biased reasoning 
produced by the failure to consider the benefits bequeathed to the non-disabled or the penalties inflicted on disabled 
citizens by the existing milieu.”); see generally Stein, supra note 7, at 604-09 (“The canonical treatment of ADA 
accommodations views the source of whatever extra cost their provision engenders as arising from the endogenous, 
inherent inability of the disabled, rather than through the exogenous, constructed social environment.”). 
74 See Susan Stefan, “You’d Have to be Crazy to Work Here”: Worker Stress, The Abusive Workplace, and 
Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 832 n.164 (1998) (“For example, curb cuts and ramps benefit people 
on bicycles, people with strollers, people on skates, as well as people with mobility or visual impairments.”); see 
also Vicki Shultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1931-32 (2000) (“Once again, making way for ‘them’ 
helps make way for all of us. The ADA requires both structural transformations - such as building ramps - and 
individual accommodation - such as allowing employees to work around their treatment schedules. These changes 
can benefit all of us, not simply those of us who meet the legal definition of ‘persons with disabilities.’ People who 
push baby strollers or ride bicycles appreciate ramps along with people in wheelchairs; and almost everyone can 
benefit from flexibility in scheduling.”).
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benefits rather than charged in its entirety to the employee with a wheelchair.  In addition, an 
accommodation may benefit many employees.  For example, providing a text-only feature on an 
employer’s intranet would benefit many employees with vision impairments, not merely the 
employee who requested it.  The cost of the software needed to make the intranet accessible 
should be spread across any employee whose productivity increases due to the intranet’s greater 
accessibility.  All of these factors should be taken into account before assigning an 
accommodation’s costs to an employee’s wage. 
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Graph #4, which is a further elaboration of Graph #3, depicts how an accommodation 
may increase the employer’s dividends when an after-hiring impairment arises.75 The adjusted 
wage curve WA illustrates the effects on the employee’s wage of an accommodation provided by 
the employer at or around Tenure B.76 The employee’s effective wage increases at Tenure B as a 
result of the accommodation’s cost and remains at that higher level through Tenure F.  In 
essence, the employee’s effective wage shifts up and remains higher for the duration of the 
employment relationship.  Because of the accommodation, the employee’s productivity returns 
to the level expected prior to the impairment (i.e., to MP from MPI(B)) for the duration of the 
 
75 An accommodation may be a one-time accommodation (e.g., the purchase of an assistive device, the 
modification of physical work space) or a continuing accommodation (e.g., hiring a reader for a vision-impaired 
employee, providing an employee with regular, intermittent medical leaves).  This analysis assumes that an 
employer will amortize the accommodation’s costs over the term of its relationship with the employee in either case; 
accordingly, the costs of a one-time accommodation last as long as the costs of a continuing accommodation.  
Regardless, there is some evidence that the average cost of accommodations is quite small.  See, e.g., Heidi M. 
Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II - Patents and 
Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 88-90 (1998) (“The findings of 
the present study show that the AT inventions typically were "low tech," inexpensive, and represent "capital 
improvements" from which all employees may benefit. The low direct costs of accommodations for employees with 
disabilities has been shown to produce substantial economic benefits to companies, in terms of increased work 
productivity, injury prevention, reduced workers' compensation costs, and workplace effectiveness and efficiency.”). 
76 The cost of the accommodation also could be expressed as the marginal productivity curve shifting down 
because the impairment requires the employer to invest more capital for the worker to achieve the same 
productivity.  This would simply be another way to express the same general concept reflected in this section’s 
treatment of the accommodation as a wage increase. 
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employment relationship (i.e., until Tenure F).  For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume 
that the accommodation has no greater productivity effects, although I will relax this assumption 
below.77 
If the improvement in the employee’s productivity (e.g., from MPI(B) to MP) exceeds the 
cost of the accommodation (i.e., WA1 - W), then the employer benefits from the accommodation 
according to the first measure: the employer is better off with the accommodation than without 
it.78 The employer’s dividend is larger than it would have been if the employee continued 
working without the accommodation.  Yet, the employer’s dividend will not return to the level it 
would have reached absent the impairment.  It necessarily falls short by the amount of the 
accommodation’s cost.  The employer, therefore, does not benefit according to the second 
measure: the employer is not better off with the accommodation and the impairment than it 
would have been without the impairment.  But further analysis is required before arriving at a 
firm conclusion about whether the second measure can be satisfied. 
 The effect of the accommodation on the employee’s dividend is the sum of the difference 
between the effective wage and the actual wage (i.e., WA - W) and the difference between the 
pre-impairment and post-impairment opportunity wages (i.e., OW - OWI(B)).  The wage simply 
 
77 For this reason, the MPA is not relevant to the instant discussion.  It becomes relevant below.  Further, 
the assumption made here that the employee’s productivity returns to MP as a result of the accommodation serves 
only to simplify this discussion and the attending graph.  It is not essential to the conclusion discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
78 This conclusion is correct whether or not the employee’s productivity returns to MP or increases only to 
a level between MP and MPI(B). As long as the difference between the employee’s post-accommodation and pre-
accommodation productivity exceeds the cost of the accommodation, this conclusion stands. 
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increases with the cost of the accommodation.  As intuition might suggest, a more expensive 
accommodation yields a higher dividend for the employee because the difference between the 
aggregate effective wage and the aggregate actual wage is greater while the opportunity wage 
remains at its post-impairment level.   
 The opportunity wage may be the more intriguing factor.  The current employer’s 
provision of an accommodation does not affect the employee’s post-impairment opportunity 
wage (OWI(B)).  Simply, other employers do not reap productivity benefits or pay higher wages 
because this employer has provided an accommodation.  Accommodations that involve 
modifications to an employer’s physical work environment, like a ramp or expanded doorways 
that accommodate workers in wheelchairs, cannot be transferred from one employer to the next.  
It is also reasonable to assume that an employer would not consent to a departing employee 
taking a mobile accommodation (e.g., specialized software, an assistive device) with her to a new 
employer.  Strictly speaking, therefore, the current employer’s accommodation should not affect 
the employee’s opportunity wage.  As a result, the opportunity wage will remain at the lower, 
post-impairment level (OWI(B)) after the accommodation is provided rather than returning to the 
pre-impairment level (OW).  The employee’s adjusted dividend, therefore, is larger after the 
accommodation.79 
79 Some employers in the external labor market may have previously modified their workplaces to 
accommodate other workers with similar or identical impairments.  If these accommodations would equally benefit 
employees working for other employers (e.g., a ramp for employees with wheelchairs would benefit any prospective 
employee using a wheelchair), then these employees’ opportunity wages would not shift down to OWI(B). This 
result will occur only with easily shared accommodations that are made widely available throughout the workforce, 
like a ramp or other architectural change, as opposed to individualized accommodations tailored to bridging the gap 
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An objection might be raised that, while it is literally true that the next best employer 
does not benefit from the current employer’s provision of an accommodation, employers in the 
external labor market are also subject to the ADA’s accommodation mandate.  If the next best 
employer obeys this mandate, then the employee’s productivity in the external labor market (and, 
therefore, her opportunity wage) should also return to its expected pre-impairment level (i.e., 
OW).  But this objection runs counter to the economics of the external labor market and the 
realities of employment discrimination practice.  The external labor market is a competitive 
market.  Prospective employees and employers are largely fungible.80 Employers will not hire 
workers with impairments who are made more expensive by an accommodation’s costs when 
they can hire comparatively cheaper workers who do not need accommodations.81 
Unfortunately, the ADA has not changed employers’ decision making in this regard.  The ADA’s 
prohibitions on discrimination in hiring decisions are largely unenforceable, in part because 
discrimination-in-hiring claims are very difficult to prove.82 In addition, the worker has little or 
no investment in its relationship with any given employer in the external labor market, so she has 
 
between an employee’s impairment and the workplace environment, like a particular assistive device or alternative 
work arrangement. 
80 See supra text accompanying note 35-36 (discussion of the external labor market). 
81 This analysis presumes that the worker’s impairment is known.  See infra Part IID for a discussion of 
hidden impairments in the external labor market. 
82 See supra note 11 (discussing evidence regarding ADA hiring claims and hiring claims under other 
employment discrimination statutes). 
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less incentive to bring a hiring discrimination claim.83 In the absence of an enforceable 
prohibition on hiring discrimination that exposes the next best employer to a genuine risk of 
added costs, the next best employer cannot be expected to provide an accommodation.  As a 
result, the employee’s opportunity wage will not return to its pre-impairment level when the 
current employer provides an accommodation. 
 In sum, the accommodation and the impairment combine to raise the height of the 
internal labor market’s competitive barriers.  Just like firm-specific skills and knowledge, the 
accommodation and the impairment increase the benefits of the internal labor market for the 
employee.  As with the employee’s unaccommodated impairment, the alternative to continuing 
her relationship with her current employer — that is, seeking employment in the external labor 
market — is less remunerative over the long term because of her lower opportunity wage.  But 
the introduction of the accommodation means that the employee also receives a higher effective 
wage from her current employer than she would receive from another employer.  As a result, the 
competitive barrier is higher with the accommodation and the impairment than it would be with 
the impairment alone and significantly higher than it would be without the accommodation and 
the impairment. 
 The preliminary conclusion of this analysis, therefore, is that an accommodation can 
produce a Pareto superior outcome when compared with a continuing employment relationship 
without an accommodation. The employer’s dividend increases and the employee’s dividend 
increases.  Thus, accommodating an employee’s after-hiring impairment can satisfy the first 
 
83 See supra text accompanying notes 35-61 (discussion of the nature of relationships in the external labor 
market and contrasting it with the shared investments found in the internal labor market). 
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measure of providing a benefit to the employer: the employer’s dividend is higher with the 
accommodation than it would have been if the employer continued the employment relationship 
without an accommodation.  But this preliminary conclusion is incomplete.  Also, it does not 
answer the question of whether the employer would be better off according to the second 
measure — that is, the employer is better off continuing its relationship and accommodating the 
incumbent employee with an after-hiring impairment than it would have been if the employee 
did not have an impairment.  The following sub-sections will add more relevant factors to the 
analysis. 
 (3) The Consequences of Delaying the Accommodation 
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Graph #5 depicts the consequences for the employer of delaying an accommodation when 
the employee experiences an after-hiring impairment at Tenure B.  A delay could result from 
difficulties with identifying an appropriate accommodation, a protracted interactive process, or 
employer or employee intransigence.84 If the employee were to file a charge with the EEOC, and 
certainly if that charge were to be litigated in federal court, then a significant delay is likely.85 
Rather than providing the accommodation at Tenure B, therefore, this graph assumes that the 
employer provides the accommodation at Tenure C.  It also assumes that the employee continues 
working for the employer between Tenure B and Tenure C and her productivity during this 
period is lower (i.e., MPI(B)) because of the impairment’s interaction with the employer’s 
unadapted work environment. 
 The delay effects a small reduction in the employee’s dividend increase.  The 
accommodation increases the employee’s effective wage from W to WA beginning at Tenure C 
until Tenure F rather than from Tenure B to Tenure F, so the aggregate wage increase is smaller.  
The post-impairment opportunity wage is lower than the pre-impairment opportunity wage and 
 
84 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 132 (US Airways took five months to respond to Barnett’s request for 
an accommodation).
85 See Paul Steven Miller, A Just Alternative or Just an Alternative? Mediation and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 11 20-22 (2001) (“When mediated, the average processing time for ADA 
complaints is nearly cut in half, as compared to the time it would take the EEOC to administratively address the 
complaint. This time frame includes the time from the charging party walking in the door of the EEOC to the time of 
resolution or impasse. On average, ADA charges take 286 days to reach a determination in the EEOC's 
administrative process while mediated ADA charges took on average 151 days to reach final resolution.”).
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unaffected by the accommodation.  By contrast, the employer’s situation is worse than if it had 
provided the accommodation at Tenure B.  The employer’s dividend period begins later (i.e., at 
Tenure BN rather than at Tenure B).  Also, the employee’s productivity is lower from Tenure B to 
Tenure C than it otherwise would have been.  Since the employee’s effective wage does not 
change between Tenure B and Tenure C, the employer’s dividend is larger than it would have 
been absent any accommodation, but smaller than it would have been if the employer had 
provided the accommodation as soon as possible after the impairment arose.86 
This analysis enriches the preliminary conclusion.  The employer can benefit from 
providing an accommodation, at least according to the first measure, but it is more likely to 
benefit if it accommodates the employee as soon as possible after the impairment arises.  But 
timing is only one additional factor, along with cost, in the economic assessment of an 
accommodation.  Productivity is the other critical factor.  Even with the employee’s effective 
wage shifting up and remaining higher at Tenure B because the employer immediately 
accommodated the employee’s impairment when it arose, the critical factor from the employer’s 
perspective is the employee’s productivity.  If the employee’s productivity merely returns to the 
level expected before the impairment (i.e., return from MPI(B) to MP) for the remainder of the 
 
86 This difference would be narrowed to the extent that the employer is insured against any losses that 
might occur during the period after the impairment and before the provision of the accommodation.  For example, 
workers’ compensation insurance or temporary disability insurance may provide the employee with full or partial 
wage replacement during this period.  See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 1-401 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 
2005)(New York State’s workers’ compensation law); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-25 to :21-65 (2004) (New Jersey’s 
temporary disability insurance law).  However, insurance bears costs, so the general principle remains true even if 
the employer has insured itself against this risk. 
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employment relationship, then the employer’s dividend will be smaller than it would have been 
absent the impairment. 
 (4) The Accommodation’s Enhanced Productivity Effect 
The nature of the employee’s relationship with her employer changes as a result of the 
employee’s after-hiring impairment and the employer-provided accommodation.  The employee 
reaps a larger dividend which raises the height of the competitive barrier in the internal labor 
market.  The higher competitive barriers effect a tighter binding of the employee to the 
employer.  This tighter bond creates an opportunity for the employer and the employee to reduce 
the employer’s labor costs and increase the employee’s productivity.  The parties’ response to 
the employee’s impairment and the accommodation can influence, even determine, the 
accommodation’s effect on productivity.  The parties are not passive observers of economic, 
physical, or mental phenomena unfolding before them.  Accommodations create conditions in 
which the parties’ behavior can change their efficiency calculi. 
 Thus, the change in the nature of the employment relationship requires relaxing the 
assumption that an accommodation’s only productivity effect is to return the employee’s 
marginal productivity to its pre-impairment level.  By relaxing this assumption, it becomes 
possible to identify circumstances within which the accommodation will have an enhanced 
productivity effect that could make it possible to satisfy the second measure of whether an 
employer benefits from providing the accommodation — that is, the employer may be better off 
providing an incumbent employee with an accommodation than it would have been if the 
employee did not have an impairment. 
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More tightly binding the employee to the internal labor market may largely or entirely 
free the employer from potential risks of loss in its relationship with the employee.  The 
employee’s aversion to the external labor market increases as the opportunity wage decreases.  
The employee’s commitment to the internal labor market increases with her effective wage 
which includes the accommodation’s cost.  As a result, the impairment and accommodation will 
reduce the risk that the employee will separate from her current employer to seek employment in 
the external labor market before the employer can reap its full dividends.87 The risk may even be 
eliminated.  Also, the employee will avoid any behaviors that might subject her to being 
discharged into the external labor market.  Thus, the risk that the employee will shirk or engage 
in other strategic behavior will be significantly reduced or eliminated.  Empirical evidence 
supports these conclusions.  Employees with disabilities receiving accommodations have lower 
job turnover rates and equivalent or lower absenteeism rates when compared with employees 
without disabilities.88 
87 This conclusion and others in this section are premised on the assumption that labor supply is elastic. 
88 See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TRANSCENDING 
COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 12 (1996) (finding a lower turnover rate 
among workers with disabilities than workers without disabilities); Stein, , supra note 10, at 104-105 (finding a 
lower absenteeism rate among workers with disabilities than workers without disabilities) (citing Gretchen Adams-
Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Janitorial Workers with Mental Retardation and Their Non-
Disabled Peers on Retention and Absenteeism, J. REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 1996 at 56, 59; Rick A. Lester & 
Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEV. J., Aug. 1987 at 50, 51; J.E. 
Martin et al., Work Attendance in Competitive Employment: Comparison Between Employees Who Are Non-
Handicapped and Those Who Are Mentally Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142, 145 (1985); Dolores 
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Reducing the employer’s risks may have two effects.  First, the employee’s productivity 
increases if the employee shirks less, or not at all.  Second, the employer’s costs of monitoring 
the employee to avoid shirking decline; therefore, the employee’s cost to the employer — the 
effective wage — declines.  But risk reduction may be only the beginning of the beneficial 
effects an accommodation can have on the productivity of an employee with an after-hiring 
impairment.   
 The employee’s tighter bond to the internal labor market makes it possible for the 
employee and the employer to cooperate more fully for the purpose of increasing the employee’s 
productivity to a level beyond what she might have achieved absent the impairment.  At a 
minimum, the employee with a disability can be expected to undertake all necessary efforts to 
increase her productivity over the life of her relationship with the employer, like acquiring firm-
specific skills and knowledge or willingly acceding to her employer’s job match decisions.89 In 
addition, while employers in typical relationships with employees hesitate to invest in their 
employees’ acquisition of general skills because of the risk that the employee will quit, this 
hesitation should disappear in this scenario.  The accommodated employee with an after-hiring 
impairment is significantly less likely to quit for the purpose of selling her general skills to other 
 
Ondusko, Comparison of Employees with Disabilities and Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, J. 
APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING, Summer 1991 at 19, 22-23). 
89 See generally Verkerke, supra note 10, at 948 (“While cost sharing responds to unusual worker 
preferences, efficient job assignments in more ordinary circumstances require matching workers to jobs in which 
they will be most productive. Indeed, one of the central lessons of the economic framework is that matching plays a 
critical role in promoting labor market efficiency.”).
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employers.  The employer can invest in the employee’s acquisition of productivity-enhancing 
general skills without fear that these investments will benefit a competitor. 
 Graph #4 illustrates all of these effects, again assuming that the employer provides the 
accommodation when the impairment occurs at Tenure B.  First, the marginal productivity curve 
shifts up (i.e., from MP to MPA) if the employee does not shirk and/or the employer and 
employee cooperate more fully in productivity-enhancing behaviors.  Second, the employer’s 
costs of monitoring the employee to avoid shirking decline; therefore, the employee’s cost to the 
employer — the effective wage — shifts down.  These lower monitoring costs may decrease the 
effective wage sufficiently to offset the increase in the effective wage that results from the 
accommodation (i.e., returning to W from WA).  The combined effect of higher productivity and 
a lower effective wage would be to increase the employer’s dividend and to allow the dividend 
period to last longer (i.e., until Tenure EN rather than Tenure E).   
 If the increase in the employer’s productivity above the level of productivity expected 
before the impairment (i.e., MPA - MP) equals the net costs of the accommodation (i.e., 
subtracting the reduced monitoring costs from the accommodation’s gross costs), then the 
employer will not merely reap a higher dividend than it would have yielded after the employee’s 
impairment arose.  The employer will yield the same dividend it expected from its relationship 
with the employee before the after-hiring impairment arose.  If the present value of the difference 
between the effective wage curve WA (or even W) and the adjusted productivity curve MPA
between Tenure B and Tenure EN exceeds the difference between the marginal productivity curve 
MP and the actual wage curve W from Tenure B to Tenure E, then providing the accommodation 
will generate a larger dividend for the employer than the employer could have expected before 
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the after-hiring impairment arose.90 The employer will be better off accommodating the 
employee with an after-hiring impairment than it would have been if the worker did not have an 
impairment.  Of course, satisfying this higher standard necessarily also means satisfying the first 
measure’s lower standard. 
 Thus, the preliminary conclusion is further enriched by taking account of the 
accommodation’s enhanced productivity effect.  The cost of the accommodation and the timing 
of the accommodation are not the only factors relevant to determining an accommodation’s 
economic consequences.  The response of the employee and the employer to the impairment and 
accommodation — that is, their ability and willingness to cooperate to exploit the opportunity 
presented to them — is an equally critical factor. 
 In sum, the enriched — but still preliminary — conclusion of this analysis is that 
employers can benefit from accommodating employees with after-hiring impairments according 
to both measures of employer benefits.  The employer’s dividend is likely to be higher than 
would have been expected after the impairment arose (i.e. the first measure).  The employer’s 
dividend may also be higher than expected before the impairment arose; that is, the employer 
may be better off accommodating the employee with an impairment than if the employee did not 
have an impairment (i.e., the second measure).  This result depends upon the accommodation’s 
cost, which is partly a function of timing, and its effect on the employee’s productivity.  Most 
important, the parties’ response to the employee’s impairment and the accommodation can 
influence, even determine, the accommodation’s effect on productivity.  The parties are not 
 
90 I have not discounted the cost of the accommodation to its present value because the cost arises at the 
time of the accommodation rather than over time or at a later time. 
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passive observers.  Accommodations and impairments create conditions in which the parties’ 
behavior can determine their economic fate. 
 C. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market: Transfers, Promotions and 
Job Re-Designs
The second scenario in which an incumbent employee might request an accommodation 
would involve a promotion or transfer into a new job which the employee could not perform 
adequately without an accommodation.  A job may also be re-designed to include new 
requirements that the employee will not be able to satisfy without an accommodation.  While 
different in many respects, promotions, transfers, and job-designs have the same effect on the 
relationship between an employer and an employee with an impairment.91 Accordingly, this 
section will analyze them together. 
 Promotions and transfers are a predictable product of the rolling renegotiations that occur 
as the employee and the employer seek to assure both rising productivity and rising wages.92 In 
fact, the job-match theory of the internal labor market presupposes promotions and transfers.  As 
the employer learns more about an employee’s abilities, the employer moves the employee into 
 
91 Distinguishing this analysis from the preceding section’s analysis does not require assuming that the 
employee’s impairment was present at the time she was hired.  The only necessary assumption is that the 
impairment, regardless of when it arose, had no effect on the employee’s productivity prior to the promotion, 
transfer, or job re-design. 
92 See supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing the rolling renegotiations that occur in the internal 
labor market).
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the optimal assignment.93 Human capital theory would explain promotions and transfers in much 
the same way.  In order to reap the fullest benefits of the employee’s acquisition of firm-specific 
skills and knowledge over time, the employer may move the employee into a job in which her 
skills and knowledge can be best exploited.94 Thus, in these circumstances, promotions and 
transfers can fulfill the employer’s expectations of rising productivity and, derivatively, the 
employee’s expectations of rising wages. 
 Promotions and transfers play a different role in supervision theory.  Understanding this 
role requires re-defining “wages.”  Employees may value non-pecuniary aspects of their working 
environment as much as they value cash wages.  For example, employees may prefer to avoid 
strenuous physical labor, night work, or dangerous assignments.  Working in jobs with these 
characteristics would impose “shadow prices” on the employee; that is, the jobs are less valuable 
to the employee.95 The shadow prices reduce the job’s effective wage.  By comparison, 
transferring from a job with shadow prices to a job without shadow prices increases the 
employee’s effective wage even if the employee’s cash wages have not changed.  Similarly, 
transferring to a job with “shadow benefits” — for example, greater prestige or a larger, more 
comfortable office — would increase the employee’s effective wage.96 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
94 See Harris, supra note 5, at 188. 
95 See Wim Groot & Maartje Verberne, Aging, Job Mobility, and Compensation, 49 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 380, 382-83 (July 1997). 
96 See id. at 381-82.  
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Unlike human capital theory and job match theory, supervision theory detaches wages 
that rise with tenure from productivity that rises with tenure.97 Supervision theory posits that 
rising wages are a reward deferred until later in the employee’s career as an incentive for greater 
effort expended earlier in the employee’s career.98 The employer benefits, therefore, by finding 
a reward that does not entail higher cash wages.  The employer may increase an employee’s 
effective wage over the course of the employee’s tenure by promoting or transferring the 
employee from high shadow-price jobs into lower shadow-price jobs or higher shadow-benefit 
jobs.  For example, airline employees in cargo-handling jobs may prefer less physically 
strenuous work as they age.  The airline might increase these employees’ effective wage by 
reserving easier, lower shadow-price jobs — like sedentary jobs in a mail room — for senior 
workers.  These lower shadow prices would be intended to deter the cargo handlers from 
shirking.99 The lower shadow prices of the less strenuous jobs take the place of higher actual 
wages as the enforcement tool. 
 An employer might use shadow prices and shadow benefits to reward employees for 
higher productivity consistent with human capital theory and job match theory, but it is less 
likely.  Human capital theory and job match theory both posit a causal — if not perfect — 
connection between rising productivity and rising wages throughout much of an employee’s 
career.100 Rising productivity creates the additional resources necessary to pay rising actual 
 
97 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
98 See id.
99 See Harris, supra note 5, at 163. 
100 See supra note 47 and text accompanying notes 38-45. 
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wages.  There is no need to find a non-cash substitute.  However, if the employee agrees to 
accept lower shadow prices or higher shadow benefits in lieu of cash wages, an intriguing and 
important wage effect occurs: the employee and the employer experience different effective 
wages.  The employee’s effective wage is the actual wage plus or minus the shadow benefit or 
shadow price.  The employer’s effective wage is simply the actual cash wage.  Thus, the 
introduction of a promotion, transfer, or job re-design which changes the values of shadow prices 
and benefits would cause these two wage curves to diverge.  This divergence will prove relevant 
to assessing an accommodation’s effects on the economics of the employment relationship. 
 Job re-designs will operate much like promotions and transfers.  Consistent with human 
capital theory or job match theory, an employee’s job might be reorganized to increase the 
employee’s productivity by better exploiting her skills and knowledge.  Consistent with 
supervision theory, a re-design might reduce shadow prices by removing unpleasant or 
physically taxing aspects of the employee’s job.101 Thus, job-redesigns are included in the 
following analysis. 
 Of course, an employee’s impairment may have no effect on her employer’s decision to 
promote or transfer the employee or to re-design the employee’s job.  An employee with an 
impairment who is capable of performing the essential functions of one job may be perfectly 
capable of performing the essential functions of many jobs.102 In addition, internal labor market 
 
101 It is also possible to increase shadow prices with a job re-design. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 188-90 (2002) (plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis was 
newly required to open and close car doors on the assembly line, apply oil to the cars, and wipe them down). 
102 Cf. supra 13 (giving the ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability”). 
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theory does not presuppose that each employee has a fixed career path laid out on the day she is 
hired.  Each employee may well follow an idiosyncratic career path.103 As long as wages exceed 
productivity and the opportunity wage, efficiencies result.  It follows, therefore, that an 
employee’s career path may not lead inexorably to a single promotion or transfer.104 An 
employee who is unable to accept one job because of her impairment might be more productive 
with rising wages in a different job without an accommodation.  Nonetheless, this analysis is 
concerned only with those circumstances in which the promotion, transfer, or job re-design 
necessarily precedes further increases in wages and productivity and the promotion, transfer, or 
job re-design cannot occur unless the employer accommodates the employee.  The employer may 
be accommodating the employee for the first time or the employer may be required to substitute 
a new accommodation for an old accommodation that is inadequate for the employee’s new or 
newly re-designed job. 
 (1) Promotions, Transfers, Job Re-Designs, and Actual Wages 
103 See Joseph G. Altonji & Nicolas Williams, The Effects of Labor Market Experience, Job Seniority, and 
Job Mobility on Wage Growth, 17 RES. LAB. ECON. 233, 243 (1998) (discussing how the experiences of employees 
in the internal labor market can be unique and varied); see also Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, Returns 
to Seniority in Union and Nonunion Jobs: A New Look at the Evidence, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 4 (1988) 
(finding heterogeneity among individuals and job matches); Joseph G. Altonji & Robert A. Shakotko, Do Wages 
Rise with Job Seniority, 54 REV. ECON. STUD. 437, 438 (1987)(same). 
104 See generally Harris, supra note 5, at 156-63 (discussing the role of promotions in the various internal 
labor market theories). 
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Graph #6 depicts the effects of an accommodation that facilitates a promotion, transfer, 
or job-redesign when the employee receives higher actual wages as her tenure increases.  In this 
situation, the employee and the employer have the same effective wage — that is, the actual 
wage.  This graph assumes that the employee’s unaccommodated impairment would prevent her 
from being promoted or transferred, or her job re-designed, at Tenure B.  Without the 
accommodation, the productivity curve flattens as a result of the impairment (i.e., from MP to 
MPI(B)).  As compared with the employer’s expectations, the employer would earn a smaller 
dividend lasting only from Tenure B to Tenure DO, rather than from Tenure B to Tenure E.  The 
employer would also invest more for a longer period of time (i.e., from Tenure DO, rather than 
Tenure E, to Tenure F).  The smaller dividend and the larger investment make it less likely that 
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the employer’s relationship with this employee will yield a dividend because of the employee’s 
impairment.  
 As with the after-hiring impairment scenario, the accommodation changes this result.  
Once again, the opening assumption is that the accommodation merely returns the employee’s 
productivity to its expected level (i.e., back to MP from MPI(B)).  Unlike in the analysis of an 
after-hiring impairment, however, the employee’s opportunity wage curve (OW) has not shifted 
down as a consequence of the impairment.  The employee’s productivity with another employer 
would not be affected by this employer’s inability to promote or transfer the employee or 
redesign her job.  This difference proves to be very important. 
 The remaining factor in this efficiency analysis is the employee’s effective wage.  The 
effective wage includes the costs of the accommodation.  WA depicts the effect on both parties’ 
effective wage of an accommodation.  The effective wage shifts up at Tenure B and remains 
higher from Tenure B through Tenure F.  The essential calculus has not changed.  If the 
productivity increase (i.e., MP - MPI(B)) exceeds the cost of the accommodation (i.e., WA - W), 
then the accommodation benefits the employer according to our first measure.  The employer’s 
dividend will be greater than it would have been if the employer did not provide the 
accommodation and the employee was, as a result, inhibited from being promoted or transferred 
or her job re-designed.  The question remains whether the employer would earn a higher 
dividend than it expected before learning that the impairment would inhibit the promotion, 
transfer, or job re-design — that is, whether the second measure can be satisfied.  This question 
depends upon whether this impairment and accommodation will effect a further increase in the 
employee’s productivity.   
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As the previous section explained, the enhanced productivity effect is a possible 
consequence of the increase in the employee’s dividend.  In the after-hiring impairment scenario, 
the employee reaped a larger dividend because her impairment drove down her opportunity wage 
and the accommodation drove up her effective wage.  In this scenario, however, the employee’s 
dividend increases only by the amount of the accommodation’s cost.  The impairment does not 
cause the opportunity wage to shift down; therefore, the dividend increases only in the amount of 
WA - W because OW remains constant.  Thus, the employee’s increased dividend is probably not 
as large as it would be with an after-hiring impairment, but larger than it would have been in the 
absence of the impairment and accommodation.   
 This larger dividend more tightly binds the employee to the internal labor market, but to a 
lesser extent than in the after-hiring impairment scenario.  Nonetheless, conditions will be 
created for less shirking, lower monitoring costs, and greater productivity-enhancing cooperation 
than would have been possible absent the impairment and accommodation.105 Productivity may 
not increase and costs may not decrease as much as they might with the accommodation of an 
after-hiring impairment.  As a result, the possibility that the employer’s dividend will increase 
beyond the expected dividend is smaller.  The first measure of whether the employer benefits 
from the accommodation may be satisfied, but it is less likely that the second measure — the 
employer is better off with the accommodation and impairment — will be satisfied.  Yet, some 
possibility remains. 
 (2) The Role of Shadow Prices and Shadow Benefits 
105 Again, this assumes some elasticity of labor supply. 
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Graph #7 introduces shadow prices and shadow benefits into the analysis.  Again, the 
accommodation and the promotion, transfer, or job re-design would occur at Tenure B.  The 
employee’s position depicted in Graph #6 does not change, so it is not repeated on Graph #7; 
however, the explanation for the employee’s position changes.  The employee’s effective “wage” 
no longer consists merely of the actual wage or, after the accommodation, the actual wage plus 
the accommodation’s cost.  The effective wage takes into account the fact that the employee has 
been promoted or transferred into a job with a lower shadow price or higher shadow benefits, or 
had her job re-designed to reduce its shadow price or increase its shadow benefits.  Thus, WA —
the employee’s effective wage curve — is the sum of the actual wage, the cost of the 
accommodation, and the jobs’ shadow prices and benefits. 
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The employer’s effective wage changes for the same reasons, but in a different way.  
Shadow prices and shadow benefits reflect employee preferences.  They do not contribute to the 
employer’s effective wage curve.  The employer’s effective wage would be the employee’s 
actual wage; therefore, the employer’s effective wage is lower than the employee’s effective 
wage.  On Graph #7, W illustrates the employee’s effective wage absent the accommodation — 
that is, the actual wage with shadow prices or benefits. Wer illustrates the employer’s effective 
wage without an accommodation if (1) the employee could be promoted or transferred, or her job 
re-designed, and (2) the promotion, transfer, or job re-design reduces shadow prices or increases 
shadow benefits.  It is the employee’s actual wage without shadow prices or benefits.  The 
difference between W and Wer is the value of the shadow prices or shadow benefits to the 
employee.106 
The inability to promote or transfer the employee or re-design her job because of her 
impairment reduces the employer’s dividend.  Without the impairment, the employer had 
expected to earn dividends from Tenure B to Tenure EO. The unaccommodated impairment will 
 
106 I have assumed that shadow prices would change the slope of the employer’s effective wage curve 
(Wer) when compared with the employee’s effective wage curve (W).  The slope would change if the employer 
prefers that shadow prices play an increasing role, and actual cash wages a declining role, as the employee’s tenure 
increases.  It is reasonable to assume that employers would prefer lower labor costs over time.  But this assumption 
is not essential to the analysis.  If shadow prices play a constant role over the course of the employment relationship, 
the employerss effective wage curve (Wer and WAer) would be parallel, or even identical, to the employee’s effective 
wage curve (W).  Further, the difference between the employee’s effective wage curve and the employer’s effective 
wage curve would remain the value of the shadow prices and benefits associated with the job into which the 
employee has been promoted or transferred, or the job re-design. 
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cause the employer to earn smaller dividends and only during the period from Tenure B to 
Tenure E.  Adding the accommodation into the calculus has two effects.  First, the employee’s 
productivity returns to its expected course (i.e., from MPI(B) to MP) or the higher curve (MPA)
that might result from the accommodation’s enhanced productivity effect.  Second, the effective 
wage curve shifts up to WAer. Once again, the question of whether the employer benefits can be 
answered by comparing the accommodation’s productivity effect with its cost.  If the 
productivity increase (i.e., MPA - MPI(B) or MP - MPI(B)) exceeds the cost of the accommodation 
(i.e., WAer - Wer), then the employer will reap a larger dividend as a result of the accommodation 
and satisfy the first measure of employer benefits. 
 The role of shadow prices in this calculus highlights how the parties might choose to 
resolve an accommodations dispute in a manner that the ADA does not approve: a wage 
concession by the employee.  Without the accommodation, the promotion, transfer, or job re-
design would confer lower shadow prices or higher shadow benefits on the employee in lieu of 
higher actual wages. The accommodation makes this substitution process less likely.  The added 
real cost of the accommodation eliminates or reduces the employer’s benefit from promoting or 
transferring the employee into a position with lower shadow prices or re-designing her job to 
reduce shadow prices.  Thus, the employer will make the promotion, transfer, or job re-design 
only if it will receive something in return — that is, higher productivity or, perhaps, a wage 
concession from the employee.  Higher productivity is possible, as the preceding analysis 
demonstrated; however, it may not be sufficient or it may not occur at all. 
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Why would the employee agree to a wage concession, particularly when the law prohibits 
the employer from requiring it?107 The simple answer is that the employee faces a lower-than-
expected wage if she is not promoted or transferred or her job is not re-designed.  The 
employee’s actual wage, or her effective wage taking shadow prices and benefits into account, 
will not rise because the promotion, transfer, or job re-design is the pre-condition for higher 
wages.  Yet, the promotion, transfer, or job re-design will occur only if the employer provides 
the accommodation.   Thus, this employee must choose between (1) agreeing with the employer 
to reduce the employee’s future wage increases in return for an accommodation that leads to 
higher actual or effective wages, or (2) refusing to adjust her wages and being denied the 
promotion, transfer, or job re-design without which she will receive no future wage increases.  
Given this choice, the employee may well volunteer for smaller wage increases to help pay for 
an accommodation that will lead to a larger wage increase over time.  An agreement of this sort 
might allow the employer to satisfy the second measure of employer benefits. 
 While the promotion-transfer-job-redesign scenario may best illustrate the circumstances 
in which a wage concession is plausible, wage concessions may also change the economic 
calculus for after-hiring impairments.  Any change of circumstances that allows productivity 
 
107 See generally U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, The ADA: Your Employment Rights as an 
Individual with a Disability, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada18.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2005) (“The ADA requires 
that the employer provide the accommodation unless to do so would impose an undue hardship on the operation of 
the employer's business. If the cost of providing the needed accommodation would be an undue hardship, the 
employee must be given the choice of providing the accommodation or paying for the portion of the accommodation 
that causes the undue hardship.”  Cf. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5) (2000) (imposing the obligation to provide the 
accommodation on the employer with no reference to the employee).  
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increases to match or exceed effective wage increases resulting from an accommodation sets the 
stage for a discussion about wage concessions between the employer and the employee.  Once 
again, the parties have the opportunity to determine the economic outcomes through discussions 
of productivity and wages. 
 Thus, the preliminary conclusion about whether an employer can benefit from 
accommodating an employee subject to a promotion, transfer, or job re-design differs slightly 
from the conclusion reached with respect to employees with after-hiring impairments.  It is still 
possible that an employer could benefit according to both measures.  The employer may be better 
off with the accommodation than without the accommodation (i.e., the first measure).  As with 
the after-hiring impairment, this result principally depends upon the accommodation’s cost and 
its effect on the employee’s productivity.  But the employee’s preferences, expressed in the form 
of shadow prices and shadow benefits, will also be relevant when determining whether the 
employer will benefit.  The employer may also be better off with the accommodation than it 
would have been if the employee did not have an impairment (i.e., the second measure), although 
this result may be less likely in this scenario than when the employee has an after-hiring 
impairment.  The competitive barriers will not be as high in this scenario, but the importance of 
shadow prices and shadow benefits may expand the opportunity to reduce labor costs and 
increase the employee’s productivity is smaller.  Some opportunity exists.  An opportunity also 
exists for the parties to discuss other changes in their relationship, like wage concessions, that 
will effect the desired result.  Once again, the parties can determine the outcome. 
 D. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market: Hidden Impairments
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J. Hoalt Verkerke provided a well-considered analysis of the consequences that 
unobservable or “hidden” impairments may have on workers’ efforts to seek employment in the 
external labor market.108 This analysis provides a starting place for consideration of hidden 
impairments’ effects on an internal labor market relationship.  Verkerke began with the premise 
that employee turnover can be efficient.  An employee who changes jobs to improve the match 
between her job and her skills and knowledge, or even her impairment, increases her productivity 
and her wages.109 Yet, hidden impairments frustrate the matching process, according to 
Verkerke.  
 Verkerke posited that the hidden impairment would effect the following self-perpetuating 
series of failures in the matching process in the absence of the ADA’s protections.  Employer #1 
learns about the worker’s hidden impairment through the worker’s failure to satisfy productivity 
expectations.  Unconstrained by the ADA, Employer #1 discharges the worker into the external 
labor market.  Employer #2 hires the worker without knowing that the worker has an 
impairment.  Employer #1, in order to avoid a defamation claim by the discharged worker, does 
not disclose that the worker has a hidden impairment.110 Employer #2, therefore, cannot assess 
the effects of the worker’s impairment on her productivity in the job into which she would be 
 
108 Verkerke, supra note 10, at 910-11. 
109 Id. at 910.  Verkerke’s assessment of turnover’s role in the external labor market is consistent with job-
match theory’s assessment of the role of intra-firm job change. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45; see also J. 
H. Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1998) (discussing 
the role of job matching in labor market efficiency). 
110 Verkerke, supra note 10, at 914-15.  
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hired.111 Thus, a “mismatch” between the worker and the job which Employer #2 has hired her 
to perform becomes very likely.  The cycle then repeats itself.  Employer #2 will discharge the 
worker as it learns more about her productivity, but it will not disclose what it knows to 
Employer #3.  Employer #3 will discharge the worker and fail to disclose her impairment, as 
well.  The result will be serial discharges of the worker, or “churning” and “scarring,” in 
Verkerke’s lexicon.  The worker’s record of serial discharges will eventually deter employers 
from hiring the worker regardless of the actual quality of the match between the worker’s 
abilities and the prospective job.112 Market failure and inefficiency will result. 
 The ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate serves as a brake on this process.  The 
ADA encourages employees to disclose their impairments in return for the prospect of an 
accommodation.113 Also, rather than immediately discharging the unproductive employee, the 
employer must endeavor to find a reasonable accommodation for her impairment, if one is 
available.  If an accommodation can be found that would allow the employee to increase her 
productivity to the expected level, then the employer may not discharge the employee and the 
inefficiencies of churning and scarring will be avoided.114 
111 Verkerke also correctly notes that the ADA prohibits the employer from seeking medical information 
that might disclose the hidden impairment before employment commences and limits such requests after hiring 
commences.  See id. at 924-25. 
112 See id. at 921-22.  
113 See id. at 936. 
114 See id. 
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Graph #8 depicts the internal labor market relationship between an employer and an 
employee with a hidden impairment.  The employee is hired with the impairment at Tenure A, 
but the employer learns about the impairment at Tenure B.  Absent the accommodation, the 
employee’s entire productivity curve would be lower than the employer’s pre-hiring expectations 
(i.e., MPI(A) rather than MP) because the hidden impairment inhibits the employee’s ability to 
perform.  The opportunity wage does not change, however.  Even though the employee’s actual 
productivity with the next best employer would be lower, the impairment would be hidden from 
all employers in the external labor market.  Verkerke’s analysis suggests that this market failure 
would cause other employers to pay the employee the same wage they would pay an unimpaired 
employee, at least at the outset of their relationship.  The current employer pays the expected 
wage (W) to the employee.   
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The results are entirely predictable.  The employee’s dividend remains unchanged 
because its determinants — wage and opportunity wage — do not differ from the employer’s and 
the employee’s expectations.  The employer’s dividend, however, is smaller than expected and 
lasts for a shorter period of time (i.e., from Tenure BN to Tenure DN rather than Tenure B to 
Tenure E) because of the employee’s unexpectedly low level of productivity.  The 
accommodation is introduced at Tenure B.  The wage curve shifts up to reflect the cost of the 
accommodation.  As before, WA represents the wage taking into account the accommodation.  At 
a minimum, productivity returns to its expected course (i.e., to MP from MPI(A)).   
 The first measure of employer benefits asks whether the employer is better off than it 
would have been if it continued its relationship with the employee without providing an 
accommodation.  Once again, if the value of the employee’s increased productivity exceeds the 
accommodation’s costs, then the employer benefits according to the first measure.  In other 
words, if the employee’s productivity returns to its expected level (i.e., to MP from MPI(A)), then 
the question of whether the employer derives a benefit can be answered by comparing the 
increase in productivity (MP - MPI(A)) to the increase in the effective wage (WA - W).  
 The second measure asks whether the employer can expect a larger dividend than it 
would have received without the accommodation and impairment.  A larger dividend would 
result only if the employee’s productivity increased beyond its expected level (i.e., MPA rather 
than MP) and, therefore, exceeded the accommodation’s cost.  But this enhanced productivity 
effect is less likely in this scenario than in the after-hiring impairment scenario and about as 
likely as in the promotion-transfer-job-redesign scenario.  The opportunity wage dictates this 
result.  In the after-hiring impairment scenario, the employee earned a larger dividend increased 
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by the cost of the accommodation and the decreased value of the opportunity wage.  In this 
scenario and the promotion-transfer-job-redesign scenarios, the employee’s dividend increased 
only by the amount of the accommodation’s costs.  As a result, the competitive barriers are lower 
in the latter two scenarios than in the after-hiring impairment scenario.  Any productivity 
benefits from the higher competitive barriers are likely to be smaller, if they occur at all.  Thus, 
the productivity increase may exceed the cost of an inexpensive accommodation, like a one-time 
accommodation, but it less likely to exceed the expense of a more costly, continuing 
accommodation.  The employer is, therefore, less likely to benefit when compared with its 
position absent the employee’s impairment. 
 The preliminary conclusion for this analysis closely resembles the conclusions reached in 
the two preceding sections.  An employer can benefit from accommodating an employee with a 
hidden impairment.  Depending upon the accommodation’s cost and its effect on the employee’s 
productivity, the employer may be better off with the accommodation than without the 
accommodation (i.e., the first measure).  It is somewhat less likely that the employer will also be 
better off with the accommodation than it would have been if the employee did not have an 
impairment (i.e., the second measure).  As with the promotion-transfer-job-redesign scenario, the 
competitive barriers will not be as high in this scenario as in the after-hiring impairment 
scenario.  But some increase will result from the employer’s provision of the accommodation, so 
some opportunity exists for the parties to use the interactive process to negotiate over labor costs, 
productivity, and other matter that will influence the economic results of the accommodation.   
 All three analyses in this part strongly suggest that employers can, and in some cases 
will, derive economic benefits from accommodating their employees with disabilities, even 
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taking into account only the factors contained within the narrow boundaries of the employer-
employee relationship.  Assuming that this relationship will continue, this part has shown that the 
employer will often benefit from accommodating the employee.  The more difficult question is 
whether the employer would be better off than it would have been if it had never encountered the 
accommodations issue.  This part has considered this issue in the guise of the hypothetical 
question of whether the employer is better off with the accommodation than it would have been 
if the employee did not have an impairment.  This question has avoided the issue of the costs 
associated with substituting the employee with an impairment for an employee without an 
impairment.  The next part will consider these costs and thereby move the economic analysis of 
accommodations’ benefits for employers closer to a final conclusion. 
 
Part III -  The Opportunity Benefits of Workplace Accommodations
Many of the scholars considering the ADA’s efficiency have assumed a competitive labor 
market.  This assumption presupposes that the employer makes an essentially costless choice 
between an employee with an impairment and an employee without an impairment.115 Relying 
on this assumption, these scholars would likely reject the analyses in the preceding part because 
of its presumption that the employer would continue its relationship with the employee with an 
impairment.  In a competitive labor market, where costless exchanges of employees are possible, 
employers would not be expected to retain these employees.  But exchanging an incumbent 
employee with an impairment in the internal labor market for a new worker without an 
impairment from the external labor market is not costless.  This part will discuss the costs of this 
 
115 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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exchange and how they should factor into an employer’s assessment of whether it can benefit 
from an accommodation. 
 The preceding part identified three scenarios in which an employee with an impairment 
might request an accommodation from her employer and analyzed the economic benefits that an 
employer might derive from providing that employee with an accommodation.  This part will 
add the final piece to this cost-benefit analysis.  An employer who provides an accommodation 
to an incumbent employee avoids predictable, if not certain, costs.  Just as the wage an employee 
might earn in the external labor market is an “opportunity cost” of remaining with the 
employee’s current employer (i.e., the “opportunity wage”), these avoided costs might be called 
the accommodation’s “opportunity benefits.”  These opportunity benefits are another important 
factor in determining whether an employer benefits from providing an accommodation. 
 The employer might not take opportunity benefits into account when an 
accommodation’s benefits otherwise exceed its costs.  Opportunity benefits are most relevant in 
those situations in which the costs of the accommodation exceed its benefits.  If an 
accommodation’s opportunity benefits exceed the difference between the present value of an 
accommodation’s costs (i.e., the difference between the employee’s effective wage and actual 
wage) and the present value of the accommodation’s productivity benefits (i.e., the difference 
between the employee’s productivity with the accommodation and without it), then the 
economically rational employer should choose to provide the accommodation.  At a minimum, 
an employer with notice that opportunity benefits could play this role should willingly participate 
in an interactive process to negotiate the employee’s request for an accommodation. 
 A. Opportunity Benefits and the Internal Labor Market’s Efficiencies
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Apart from the direct productivity dividends an employer derives from a long-term 
relationship with an incumbent employee in the internal labor market, the employer also benefits 
by not having to bear the transaction costs of searching for a new employee in the external labor 
market.  Each step in a hiring process entails transaction costs.  Among other benefits, the 
employer is freed from soliciting and screening resumes, reviewing credentials and references, 
interviewing applicants, and deciding which applicant to hire, among other hiring-related 
activities.  But these opportunity benefits are only a beginning.  This section will consider how 
an employer’s failure to provide an accommodation might indirectly sabotage its employees’ 
productivity and increase its labor costs, and thereby undermine the internal labor market’s 
efficiencies. 
 An employer’s refusal to provide an accommodation may have several consequences in 
the internal labor market.  The analyses in the preceding part considered the direct effects on the 
productivity of the employee with an impairment if the employer does not provide the 
accommodation; that is, the employee would not be able to perform as well without the 
accommodation.  But there may be other consequences.  In particular, the denial of an 
accommodation may cause the employee to sever its relationship with the employer.  The 
employee may be literally incapable of working without an accommodation in the job to which 
the employer has assigned her.  For example, an employee who suffers a severe back injury may 
be unable to work in a job with heavy lifting responsibilities.116 Or, the employee may simply 
quit out of frustration or anger.  In both of these situations, the employer could suffer a loss.  The 
 
116 See Harris, supra note 5, at 181 (describing how U.S. Airways refused to grant Barnett his 
accommodation thereby forcing him to quit and search for another employer). 
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employee with an impairment may have generated dividends (i.e., productivity in excess of 
wage) without the accommodation, even if those dividends would have been smaller than the 
employer expected.  For example, an employee with a bad back might have been productive in a 
job that did not require lifting.  Separation would cause these dividends to be lost.  In addition, 
the employer would lose any unrecouped investments it has sunk into the worker’s acquisition of 
skills and knowledge or its own acquisition of information about the employee’s optimal job 
match.   
 If the employee does not separate from the employer, she may feel that her expectational 
interests in promotions, transfers, job re-designs, or rising wages have been frustrated.  Her 
frustration may cause her to shirk.  Or, the employee may conclude that the employer’s denial of 
her accommodation request is strategic behavior.  For example, if the employer refused to 
provide an accommodation that the employee needs in order to accept a promotion that will 
result in higher wages,117 the employee may conclude that the employer has chosen to 
appropriate her expected wage increases.  The employee’s response may be to shirk as a means 
of recovering her lost dividends.  Even if the employee does not perceive the employer’s action 
as strategic behavior, her morale may suffer if she perceives that the employer has discriminated 
against her or treated her unfairly.  Lower morale might also lead the employee to shirk.  
 Shirking for any reason decreases the employee’s productivity.  It would also force the 
employer to invest additional resources in monitoring the employee’s performance. 118 The 
 
117 See supra text accompanying note 92-95. 
118 "Shirking" is nothing more or less than the employee's failure to contribute actively to improving firm 
productivity.  It might include slothfulness, a refusal to assist the employer with problem-solving, or any omission or 
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failure to provide the accommodation, therefore, would cause productivity to decline and the 
effective wage to rise — that is, precisely the opposite effect that providing the accommodation 
might have had.119 Yet, shirking entails risks for the employer and the employee beyond its 
direct effects on productivity and the employee’s effective wage.  If shirking causes the 
employee’s productivity to decline sufficiently, the employer may be deprived of any remaining 
dividends it might have earned from its relationship with the employee.  Lacking an economic 
rationale for continuing the relationship, the employer may discharge the shirking employee.120 
Both parties would lose any benefits that could have been derived from their relationship, and the 
employer would be required to invest in searching for a new employee.  Thus, shirking may lead 
to separation and all of the consequences associated with it. 
 The employer’s treatment of one employee may also have consequences for its 
relationships with other workers.  The group of workers most likely to be affected would be 
other incumbent employees.  As a general matter, incumbent employees have good information 
about wages, productivity, and other matters that are relevant to their implicit contracts with the 
 
commission that deprives the employer of the productivity benefits of the worker's firm-specific skills.  See Alan 
Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 183 (1991); Schwab, supra note 10, at 19; 
see generally Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (discussing how workers might transform lower morale into shirking). 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 77, 85-88, and 105. 
120 See H. Lorne Carmichael, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking and Life Cycle Incentives, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 65, 67-68 (Fall 1989); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 432. 
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employer.121 In particular, incumbent employees pay attention to the employer’s treatment of 
their co-workers because the co-worker’s relationship with the employer may be relevant to the 
employee’s own relationship with the employer.  Like the employee seeking an accommodation, 
other incumbent employees may perceive the employer’s decision as a signal that the employer 
may engage in strategic behavior.122 Some co-workers may also value a workplace culture of 
respect in which the employer searches for ways to allow every employee to make a 
contribution.  Co-workers’ most negative response would be to quit or shirk and thereby deprive 
the employer of some or all of their productivity.  More likely, these incumbent employees 
would seek some kind of procedural protections against future acts of opportunism by the 
employer.123 These protections could range from organizing a union to insisting on written 
contracts or explicit rules spelled out in an employee handbook.  Any of these responses would 
entail potentially substantial additional costs for the employer.   
 These negative responses stand at one end-point on a spectrum of possibilities.  A second, 
mid-range possibility is that incumbent employees without disabilities will view their employer’s 
 
121 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1204-05.  This general situation differs from the particular situation of 
accommodations and disabilities which is characterized by asymmetric information.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 174-77.  Incumbent employees have the best information in a unionized workplace because the union becomes 
a repository for institutional history as the workers’ representative on wage, hours, terms, and conditions of 
employment.  See Harris, supra note 8, at 1209. 
122 See generally supra text accompanying notes 56-60 (discussing “strategic” or “opportunistic” 
behavior). 
123 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 443; Schwab, supra note 8, at 11, 33 (discussing contract protections 
enforced by courts for the protection of workers throughout their life cycles). 
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rejection of an accommodation request as entirely irrelevant to their work life.  Employees 
without disabilities may not expect to need or request an accommodation.  They may also view 
the employer’s accommodation decisions as qualitatively different from other decisions that will 
affect their work lives like raises, promotions, training opportunities, or other workplace benefits.  
If the other incumbent employees draw these conclusions, then their relationships with the 
employer will not change and the employer will experience no additional costs. 
 A third possibility is that incumbent employees without disabilities will view the 
employer’s denial of an accommodation request as a wholly appropriate refusal to provide a 
“special benefit” to the employee requesting the accommodation.  This is the opposite end-point 
on the spectrum.  Incumbent employees without disabilities may feel that, by withholding an 
accommodation, the employer has refused to engage in favoritism for an employee with a 
disability.  Further, circumstances may arise in which incumbent employees without disabilities 
consider themselves to be competing with an employee with a disability for some workplace 
benefit (e.g., a promotion, a transfer, retention in a layoff).  In this context, incumbent employees 
without a disability may perceive the accommodation as an unfair competitive advantage for the 
employee with a disability.  In US Airways v. Barnett,124 for example, Barnett sought to remain 
in his mail-room position as an accommodation for his weak back.  According to the employer’s 
seniority system, the mail-room position should have been open for seniority-based bidding.  
Two co-workers with more seniority than Barnett also wanted the mail-room job.125 It is entirely 
plausible, even likely, that these senior co-workers would have perceived the employer granting 
 
124 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (plurality opinion). 
125 Id. at 394. 
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the requested accommodation as an unfair benefit for Barnett.126 In these circumstances, the 
incumbent employees without disabilities would applaud the employer’s denial of the 
accommodation request and, perhaps, view it as evidence of the vitality of their internal labor 
market relationships.  Once again, the employer would suffer no additional costs due to the co-
workers’ reactions to its accommodation decision. 
 Co-workers without disabilities may respond to an employer’s denial of an 
accommodation in any of these ways, or variations thereof.  Their responses will depend upon 
whether they expect to need an accommodation in the future, whether they view 
accommodations decisions as representative of the employer’s approach to other human capital 
issues, and their assessment of whether they are in competition with the employee with a 
disability.  For these same reasons, co-workers with disabilities can be expected to judge matters 
differently.  Depending upon the nature of their impairments and jobs, these employees are more 
likely to view themselves as potential accommodations requesters in the future.  The employer’s 
response to an accommodation request, therefore, would foreshadow future issues in these 
employees’ own employment relationships.127 Further, the work experiences of employees with 
disabilities would likely cause them to view accommodations as necessary measures to facilitate 
performance and eliminate discriminatory barriers in the workplace rather than “special 
 
126 Id. at 395.  I have argued that this perception is partly the consequence of the employer’s failure to 
explain the role of workplace accommodations to the co-workers.  See Harris, supra note 5, at 134. 
127 It is always perilous to make general statements about the attitudes of people with disabilities because 
the disabilities community is diverse and, at times, diffuse.  See JOSEPH SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 323-24 (1994). 
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benefits.”  These employees may also be more likely to adopt the view that the employer’s denial 
of an accommodations request is strategic behavior.  Accordingly, incumbent employees with 
disabilities are more likely to respond to an employer’s denial of an accommodation by seeking 
new employment or some form of assurance that they will receive their dividends from the 
internal labor market relationship.  As a result, the employer may experience a loss of these 
employees’ productivity and its sunk investments and higher labor costs. 
 The employer’s denial of its employee’s accommodation request may also affect the 
behavior of prospective employees in the external labor market, although this effect is less likely.  
In theory, prospective employees would learn of the employer’s refusal to provide the 
accommodation and, in response, either refuse any job the employer might offer or demand 
written protections to codify the implicit contract that is formed upon entry into the internal labor 
market.128 But reputation has a weaker effect in the external labor market than in the internal 
labor market, if it has any effect at all.  Simply, workers in the external labor market have 
significantly less information about the employer than incumbent employees have.  Even outside 
the disabilities context, the relationship between an employer and a prospective employee is 
characterized by asymmetric information.129 Thus, these workers may never learn about the 
employer’s decision to deny the accommodation.  If the information gets out, workers in the 
external labor market may be less interested.  They tend to be younger than incumbent 
employees and would not have finally chosen whether to make a long-term commitment to this 
 
128 See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 8, at 115-16 (certain provisions can be made that are explicit 
contracts protecting workers in the internal labor market). 
129 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 155. 
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particular employer.130 Thus, they are less concerned with issues related to job security and less 
likely to value or recognize a firm’s reputation.131 
Just like in the internal labor market, workers with disabilities in the external labor 
market may be more attentive to an employer’s accommodations policies and practices than 
workers without disabilities.  Because an accommodation could determine whether the worker 
will reap the long-term benefits of an implicit contract with the employer, it may be the single 
most critical piece of information for the worker’s decision about which employment opportunity 
to pursue. Yet, the information may not be available, and the worker may be hesitant to inquire 
too deeply into the employer’s accommodations policies and practices out of fear of losing a job 
opportunity.  Some workers may have an informal network of contacts within the employer’s 
organization who can provide information.132 But those who do not must depend upon some 
form of public disclosure to learn about how an employer treats its employees with disabilities. 
 Without public disclosure, most workers with disabilities in the external labor market will 
be unable to base their decisions on the employer’s accommodations policies and practices. A 
 
130 See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Tenure Summary (2004), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm (showing that median employee tenure is higher among older 
workers than younger ones).  For example, in January 2004, the median tenure of workers age 55 to 64 (9.6 years) 
was more than three times that of workers age 25 to 34 (2.9 years). Id.  
131 See Schwab, supra note 8, at 32; PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 74-75 and n.53 
(1990). 
132 See Harris, supra note 8, at 1209.  Workers may have social relationships with employees of the 
employer with whom the workers are negotiating.  These social relationships, even acquaintanceships, may provide 
sources of useful information. 
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mismatch may result if the worker accepts the employer’s job offer.  A better match would be a 
job with an employer that is willing to accommodate the worker’s particular impairment, or an 
employer that would not need to accommodate the worker’s impairment.  The worker’s lack of 
information, therefore, could lead to market failure and losses for the employer.  On the other 
hand, public disclosure may cause workers with disabilities to shy away from seeking jobs with 
the employer or to insist upon some form of assurance that they will receive the accommodations 
they will need.  Like Verkerke’s “churning” and “scarring,” the signal from the employer’s 
accommodation decision could prevent a worker from being matched to a job with the employer 
in which she would be highly productive — a market failure that would also effect a loss for the 
employer. 
 Thus, the preliminary conclusions in the preceding part that an employer can benefit from 
accommodating an employee with an impairment in any of the three scenarios considered must 
be enriched with an understanding of opportunity benefits.  Opportunity benefits increase the 
likelihood that an employer will benefit from an accommodation.  If avoiding the costs of 
searching for a new employee represents the first category of opportunity benefits, then a second 
category relates to the employee’s productivity, the productivity of her co-workers, and the 
transaction costs associated with maintaining productive employment relationships with all of 
these employees. Accommodations may avoid shirking, quitting, and demands for procedural 
protections that are not typical of the implicit contractual arrangements in the internal labor 
market.  Accommodations may also avoid negative reputational effects in the external labor 
market, although these effects are less likely and their consequences more difficult to measure.  
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Each of these potential opportunity benefits are relevant to determining whether an employer 
benefits from accommodating an employee with an impairment. 
 B. Litigation Costs
The ADA and other anti-discrimination statutes add the potentially substantial cost of a 
discrimination lawsuit to an employer’s economic analysis of an employee’s request for an 
accommodation.  Simply, the employee who is denied an accommodation may bring a 
discrimination claim against the employer.  The ADA defines “discrimination” to include failing 
to provide a reasonable accommodation for a qualified individual’s known physical or mental 
impairment.133 Thus, an employee who can demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual with a 
disability”134 may bring a claim against her employer if it denies her accommodation request.  
 There is no assurance that an employee’s discrimination claim will succeed.  To the 
contrary, there is evidence that employers have a disproportionately high success rate in ADA 
cases that proceed to final judgment in federal court.135 The Supreme Court has reduced 
plaintiffs’ chances of success by significantly narrowing the scope of the ADA’s protected 
 
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). 
135 See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (showing that employers win more than ninety-three percent of the ADA cases brought 
against them); Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENT. &
PHYS. DISAB. L. REP. 403 (May-June 1998) (discussing report by the American Bar Association analyzing almost 
every reported and unreported case brought under Title I of the ADA and finding that employers won 92.11 percent 
of the cases). 
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class136 and interpreting the ADA’s defenses favorably for employers.137 Nonetheless, the 
employer bears some risk of losing, even if that risk may be small under the ADA.138 Losing in 
litigation could subject the employer to the costs of the accommodation it refused to provide plus 
back pay, reinstatement, and other remedies.139 
Winning avoids court-imposed remedies, but it does not free the employer from the 
transaction costs of conducting the litigation.  The employer must retain lawyers, respond to an 
 
136 See, e.g., Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that whether an individual has a 
disability is determined by taking into account natural adjustments he has made to his impairment); Murphy v. UPS, 
527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that whether an employee has a “disability” is determined by taking into account the 
mitigating factors that he employs); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that corrective and 
mitigating measures, including eyeglasses, should be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled 
under the ADA, and that for an employee to be “substantially limited” in the major life activity of “working” she 
must be excluded from a broad class of jobs); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding 
that an employee must be prevented or severely restricted from doing tasks central to most people’s daily lives 
before she will be found to have a “disability”).  See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001) (holding that states are immune from suit under the ADA’s Title I). 
137 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (employer may rely on “business necessity” 
defense when prohibiting an employee from working in a job that could jeopardize his health); US Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that an employer’s showing that an accommodation request conflicts with 
seniority rules is sufficient to show that the accommodation is “ordinarily” not reasonable). 
138 See N.J. Stat. § 10:5-12 (2005) (making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because 
of a person’s disability [or a host of other categories], to refuse to hire or continue to employ such an individual). 
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (the ADA’s remedies provision); N.J. Stat. § 10:5-12.1 (2005) (New 
Jersey’s remedies provision for disabilities discrimination cases ). 
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EEOC investigation of the employee’s complaint, conduct and respond to discovery, and cover 
any other litigation expenses.  The employer must also bear the cost of any time which human 
resources personnel, managers, and other employees dedicate to depositions, document requests, 
meetings with lawyers, and appearances in court.140 Litigation also publicly discloses the 
employer’s decision to deny an accommodation and thereby increases the likelihood that 
prospective employees in the external labor market will learn about the decision.141 The 
employer’s costs will be lower if it can defeat the claim with a dispositive pre-trial motion, but 
litigation of any kind or duration will impose costs on the employer. 
 The most obvious way for the employer to avoid a discrimination claim and the attendant 
litigation costs is to provide the employee with an accommodation that she finds acceptable.  The 
employer avoids liability if the accommodation is “reasonable.”  But the employer avoids 
litigation costs, regardless of how a court might define “reasonable,” only if the accommodation 
is sufficient to deter the employee from filing a claim.  The employer need not provide the 
accommodation that the employee requested.  The provided accommodation can be more cost-
 
140 See, e.g., Witnesses Debate Effects of ADA at Civil Rights Commission Hearing, 67 U.S.L.W., Legal 
News, (BNA) No. 19 at 2294 (November 24, 1998) (arguing that, while employers win most ADA lawsuits brought 
against them, the average cost of these victories is $150,000 per case). 
141 See supra text accompanying note 128-32; see, e.g., Barbara Rose, $7 Million HIV-Bias Suit Hits 
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STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), August 10, 1995, at 1D. 
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effective or less helpful to the employee than a court might order.142 As long as the employee 
agrees, the accommodation delivers the opportunity benefit of avoided litigation costs to the 
employer.   
 Accommodating the employee is not the only way for the employer to avoid litigation 
costs. The employer and the employee might agree to a work arrangement or career path 
different from that contemplated when the employer hired the employee.  Or, the employee and 
the employer might separate in an amicable and efficient way, perhaps after a financial 
settlement or help from the employer finding a superior job match with another employer.  The 
ADA does not contemplate amicable separations, but it also does not prohibit them.  The 
economics of the employment relationship may lead the parties to conclude that separation or a 
restructuring of their relationship is the most efficient solution.  Again, any agreement that the 
employee finds acceptable will allow the employer to avoid litigation costs.  The question for the 
employer is, which resolution to the accommodation problem will result in benefits exceeding 
costs.  Prospective litigation costs are a part of that calculus. 
 Avoided litigation costs are a third category of opportunity benefits that an employer 
might derive by accommodating an employee with an impairment.  Losing in litigation may 
impose the greatest costs, but merely engaging in litigation imposes both direct and indirect 
costs.  Avoiding these costs also provides opportunity benefits that may change the calculus of 
whether an employer benefits from accommodating an employee with an impairment.  But 
 
142 See Miller, supra note 85, at 21-22 (according to a July 2000 EEOC report, the average monetary 
settlement of an ADA charge resulting from mediated negotiations was $11,000; other means of resolution produced 
an average result of $29,391). 
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preventing litigation almost certainly will require the employer to enter into the interactive 
process with the employee who is requesting an accommodation to persuade the employee not to 
bring a discrimination claim.  
 
Conclusion
The ADA’s interactive process — that is, the forum within which a worker with a 
disability and an employer seek to find the means to adapt the employer’s environment to the 
worker’s impairment — has long been understood as part of the statute’s authors’ codification of 
the sociological model of disability.143 But the economic utility of the interactive process and the 
negotiations that occur therein has not received adequate attention.  This article has argued that 
the interactive process is critical to understanding the economics of accommodations and, in the 
process, to broadening the dialogue about how to assess the costs and benefits of 
accommodations. 
 This article has argued that employers can benefit from accommodating their incumbent 
employees with disabilities.  The exigencies of the internal labor market, and the competitive 
barriers created by an employee’s impairment and an employer’s accommodation of that 
impairment, create an opportunity for the parties to reduce the employer’s labor costs and 
increase the employee’s productivity.  A mutually profitable accommodation agreement, 
therefore, is available to parties perceptive enough to understand their circumstances and their 
implications.  Accordingly, employers presented with a request from an incumbent employee for 
 
143 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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a workplace accommodations can, and often will, make a rational economic choice by entering 
into the interactive process and providing the employee with an accommodation. 
